


## НЕКОТОРЫЕ ГЛАВЫ ИЗ ТЕОРИИ О НЕОЖИДАННОЙ МИРОВОЙ ИСТОРИИ. ЧАСТЬ I



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### Аннотация

Триумфальный путь развития социального государства породил легитимный характер новой социальной и ментальной реальности. Дальнейший упадок социального государства также породил новую реальность, при которой стало происходить накопление разнообразных легитимностей, связанных с расцветом неоллиберализма. Третий Путь – это своеобразный ответ социал-демократии на новую политическую ситуацию в мире, сложившуюся после 1989 года, ответ, который предполагал создание некоего долгосрочного партнерства сторонников социального государства с неоллиберальным режимом, устанавливающим новый гегемонистский экономический и политический миропорядок.

Либерализм рассматривается в современных дискуссиях как выражение определенной системы ценностей. В настоящее время наибольшее внимание уделяется новому монетаристскому или экономическому либерализму. Социализм 70-х и 80-х годов был тем объектом, против которого объединились классический политический либерализм прав человека и новый монетаристский либерализм. Сторонники социального государства не смогли распознать эту новую ситуацию.

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Далее мы выдвигаем гипотезу о существовании трех «обществ» в современном глобальном мире. «Первое общество» – это общество до 1989 года, для которого главной ценностью выступало развитие социального государства. «Второе общество» мы определяем как отрицание «первого», то есть как общество господства монетаристского неолиберализма. Основы для появления «третьего общества» мы видим в новом политическом классе или элите. «Третье общество» возникает как возрождение некоторых черт «первого общества». «Второе общество», возникшее после 1989 года, в настоящее время испытывает первые глобальные потрясения, связанные с возникновением нового мирового порядка.

Ключевые слова:

глобализация, государство всеобщего благосостояния, третий путь, монетаризм, неолиберализм, государственный департамент, различие, саморазрушительное измерение глобализации, три общества глобального времени.

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## **SOME CHAPTERS FROM A THEORY ABOUT AN UNEXPECTED WORLD HISTORY. PART I**

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Abstract

The triumphant way of the social state in the direction of the providing of a legitimacy constituted a new social and mental reality. This is for us much relevant because the decline of the social state also produced a new reality. Like during the construction of the social state, an accumulation of the miscellaneous legitimizations goes on, it was therefore nec-

essary to bring on the scene the same entire pallet of the delegitimization. The Third Way is the answer of the social democracy to the new situation. An answer that offers a long-term partnership, if we want, a political marriage to the neoliberalism of an economical and political world order, which is already considered as hegemonic.

The liberalism appears in every point and as a personification of every value in the current discussions. The greatest problem in the present to set the liberalism identical to the monetarist economical system. Precisely the really existing socialism of the 70-s and 80-s averred as the subject against which a classical political liberalism of the human rights and a new economical liberalism could unit. The real socialism has not “misunderstood” this new situation. It has simply not recognized it.

We draw further up a hypothesis about three “societies” of actual global world. The first society would be the society of the good will itself, for which the value-oriented life of this year (1989) can no more become an open problem. We define the second society as the one, which is fundamentally not constituted by the above described good will. We see the third society in that political class or elite, which power has been built on the year 1989.

The “third” society is the object of the self-identification of the “first”, the “first” is the product of the year 1989. The “second” society lived after 1989 rather long in the shade; its emancipation began after the first elementary shakes of the new world order.

Keywords:

globalization, welfare state, Third Way, Monetarism, Neoliberalism, state dept, the difference, self-destructive dimension of the globalization, three societies of global time.

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### **The Welfare State as Object of a Theory**

The so-called “welfare state” (the “social” or the “redistributive” state) means in a multiple point of view a singular subject. Its theoretically distinctive characteristic is, above all, that as well its emergence as its existence is, to the same extent, a subject of politics and economy (in a system-theoretical sense). In other words, the social state is examined and lit up, in this way, by two different subsystems and there are always two perspectives, which can be directed on this subject as legitimately and which eventual differences can become quite easily the basis of further arbitrary interpretations (Plant, 1985; Pierson, 1996; Kuhnle, 2000).

Besides this very specific theoretical status, the social state applies also as a very differentiated cultural and civilization object, so that the new problematic occurs, the dimensions of politics and economy, not really mediated with each other, should still be brought also with those of the culture and the civilization into a meaningful unity. This means, that the social state is simultaneously a subject of two different normal sciences as well as the one of two meta-sciences, what constitutes undoubtedly a unique theoretical basic conceptuality.

It has to be strongly emphasized at this point and in this context that, the social state appearing after 1945 in the history, was standing on strict democratic bases. On the one hand, it was largely understood as a natural prolongation of democratic

fundamental insights, on the other hand, what was just its political decision, has been articulated also on the part of the democratic states and finally in comparison, if just not as direct contrast to the current forms of the political totalitarianism.

One of the most determining fundamental conditions of every analysis of the welfare state is that its complexity and singularity are not also promptly identified with the redistributing function. Since the redistribution is in fact perhaps the most important function of the social state, its uniqueness and complexity are in it nevertheless not at all exhausted.

This state becomes characterizeable also from an unprecedented accumulation of legitimizations, which was indeed also functionally imperative already for the reason, that the power of the redistribution can be legitimized. To become a “social” or “redistributing” state, it was necessary to the state to firstly break a long range of legitimizations. And, indeed, this was also a process of hypertrophy on the part of the state, which had abolished deliberate intentions and unconsciously remaining evidence ideas.

Out of the usual political intentions and interests of any time, it will probably be allowed to speak about the omnipotence of the idea of the redistribution and about the one of the redistributing state particularly in this age. Undoubtedly, it was also about a specific furious madness of this redistributing state regarded as omnipotent, in which it has broken in turn all functions and legitimizations of the whole-social reproduction and even still searched from time to time to take over further dimensions of the reproduction in its competence. This multiple and always completely represented legitimization accumulation has already been alone capable to raise the emergence of the social state to an event of civilizational order of magnitude.

It wins an as unexpectedly crucial significance just through the demolition of the social state, that can be already regarded today as completed. Since this is the real reason, why this demolition of the social state has become in the same way also an event of civilizational order of magnitude.

What we are fully confronted today with, is exactly the demolition and the decline of the social state as a epochal phenomenon. It is of not only about the theoretical side of this phenomenon which became a civilizational one. Its practical side is a still more intense and in every respect “practical” challenge for science and politics.

The demolition of the social state released a great number of forces, which eliminate the civilizational achievements of the social state and pave the way of a new establishment of the social reproduction through.

The triumphant way of the social state in the direction of the providing of a legitimacy constituted a new social and mental reality. At this point, this new reality is however not only of a great interest due to its various new qualities. This is for us much relevant because the decline of the social state also produced a new reality. The new reality of the no longer existing social state can only ever be assessed, if we can measure it with the also former new reality of the social state standing in blossom.

The decay of the social state reveals a twice self destructive process. It's not true, that the social state declined as a whole frame. Its decline did no longer release from this allying the numerous legitimacies eliminated in it beforehand.

The mature social state has changed the social structure. New social roles, new jobs, new values occurred because of the conviction of the omnipotence of the redistributive state.

From the intensity of this sociocultural regrouping the tendency is first to be emphasized so as the intellectual class increased clearly not only in quantity, but also in its professional diversity substantially differentiated. And it was just the development trend of the social state, which determined this differentiation process of the intellectuals. The intellectuals revealed as the hegemonic class of the social mediation. Their expansion has been motivated by the fact simple in itself, that every new step of the social state originally was an intellectual factual problem, so that the social state already depended, in the planning phase, on an as well wide as deep support from the part of the intellectuals. It has however not to be underestimated, that the social state in function also produced a high number of new functions and new social roles, which had somewhat to perform the multiple services of the social state with the right mental attitude.

According to rise and decline of the social state, it is time also to address the wide problematic of the financing of the state. In the centre of our investigation, we would not put the obviously resulting context, as how this accumulation of legitimizations and the takeover related with it of the whole-social reproduction is probably to be financed with difficulties in the long term, even not to be at all financed. This acceptance would be also largely taken as basis of the argumentation for the demolition of the social state.

In all rationality, this assumption will not give us the key toward the explanation of the unlimited plausibility of the omnipotence of the redistribution. Since the social state was by no means a product of a long rational reflection about the possibility or the impossibility of the financial affordability. Behind the emergence of the social state stood the conviction, that it cannot happen, that a state or the state, a realization of multiple and complex contracts, the bearer of eternal values and the personification of sacred traditions, that this state as a state can become a common actor of the economical life and its mission can suffer the problems or even the financing impossibility.

It was this social state to be apprehended by many as an optimum, which had challenged numerous groups and actors in a critical way. It had critically challenged the representatives of the traditional elites and in general the social status quo, while it has given to new individuals and groups considerable social chances. The social state critically challenged also all the political forces which were against the politics of the redistribution, because its successes just projected in attempts a new hegemony of the redistributive politics. The new social state at least also challenged all social classes, which – still for whatever reasons – personified the attitude, that everyone must do or perform something, with what he gets from the state.

Another chapter in the life of the new classes inaugurated by the social state opens itself to us, if we put the question, how those individuals or classes behaved by the decline of the social state, which owed their existence, in the most concrete sense, to this state.

The progress, the higher quality of life, the possibility of the social success were options of the social state, which a lot had straight accepted. The same classes, as a dialectic of the welfare state, however, by the already starting decline of this state, wanted or could no longer defend this entity. Behind these moral dimension, there is still a new anthropological dimension. Since the children of the social state became in the course of their repeated ascent other people who, in a concrete sense

of the word, could no longer renounce the newly acquired social and civilization results. It's considered as typical the example of the Scottish miner, who gave up his strike in 1986, when he would have had to sell his video set.

Finally, it is about the serious conflict between the idea and the action of the social state and the so-called New Left holding an hegemonic position also at that time. While, on the one hand, the social state was all and sundry a "left", "social democratic" and, in its later critics, a "communist" idea, the New Left saw in the social state as a still more dangerous enemy than the capitalism has otherwise been.

Like during the construction of the social state, an accumulation of the miscellaneous legitimizations goes on, it was therefore necessary to bring on the scene the same entire pallet of the delegitimization. And this is the reason, why also the demolition of the social state has become as well a civilization problem, as it has been the case with the construction.

### **The Neoliberal Turn of Social Democracy**

The Third Way is made up by neoliberalism and social democracy interwoven in a specific way. The history of Third Ways is an incomparably exciting mine of historical examples (Giddens, 1998; Giddens, 2000).

We might just remind of a strange contrast existing between the first half and the end of the nineties. While namely in the first half of the nineties (especially in post-socialist milieu) the mere thought of a Third Way counted to be politically incorrect, it was precisely the social democracy, or mainly its Anglo-Saxon equivalent, the Labor party that had enough of political abstinence concerning the Third Way.

The neoliberalism gained its mature form mainly from the opposition and latter triumph against the late communism. Therefore, its tendency is a global organization without any own political system of institutes. One of its trend is the fact, that it is also a correction of the classical liberalism. The resulting huge tension from this conflict was neutralized by the opposition to the late communism, in a way that the neoliberal politics articulating beside the neoliberal economy was made similar to the classical liberalism through the living contrast of the communism.

The neoliberal structure actualizes the tendencies of the globalization in the structure of so-called monetarism, which is not the same as an economical school of the same name, but it denotes an implementation of the structure of the globalizing economy by the sphere of the international financial organizations, i. e. the actualization of the concrete form of the globalization.

From all this results also the fact, that the social democracy, even within the frame of the Third Way-concept, can get classical liberal critics. Emphasizing the systematic nature of the neoliberalism is especially important, also because the social democracy (Labor) was trying to find the connection with this structure perceived as a system by its Third Way-concept. This also explains a fact, which is not only difficult to explain in other ways, but even seems ambiguous, since the social democracy (Labor) was not led to the concept of a Third Way identified with the neoliberalism by new insights, but to the search for the interpretation justifying this identification approach only started after a decision implying this approach.

If namely it seems possible, on the one side, to judge the fact that the neoliberal turn of the social democracy (Labor) is a consequence of some kind of adaptation

to the hegemonial state of the neoliberal–monetarist complex, on the other side, the theoretically unidentifiable relationship of the neoliberal–monetarist complex to the society appears quite a lot in such a strong approach of this complex through a political direction, which has defined itself as a representative of all social interests.

A basic condition of such an abstraction is a total former desideologization of the politics. But a certain magnitude of desideologization endangers the basic concept of the politics.

What is astonishing in this example is the new language regulation, through the same logic, even the Wimbledon Tennis Tournament could become a historical phenomenon (“it had shaken up a lot the British society” – so Blair’s Third Way). Transforming the great defeat into a slight tackle makes literarily all arbitrary changes of the language regulation possible. The fact (and justification) of doctrinally inconceivable political interests does not change the depoliticizing effects of the great functional systems.

One of the most important elements of the reorganization of the whole political space (originally neoliberal, but also used by the social-democracy of the Third Way) is a hostile identification of the state with the temporarily hegemonic social state, i. e. the neoliberal demolition of the social state becomes equal to a critical relativization of every statehood.

But it would (have) be (en) enough to flip through our childrengarden notes to recognize some functions of the state, which have nothing to do with the social state. The total elimination of the state brought a part of the society into a critically defenseless condition.

While the ephemeral welfare state has practically swallowed up all community functions, the power complex built upon great neoliberal functional systems used its fall for rolling back all civilizational achievements, which the (social) statehood had reached up to now.

Some mature concepts of the Third Way, in the programmatic form they appear to us, are in a methaphoric or realistic sense also products of a state defined by a post-historical condition, by the “End of the History” (Fukuyama, 1992). From this, it logically follows what the empirical investigation justifies each time. The concepts of the Third Way move among the whole of ideas, events, values and interpretations of each historical era so arbitrarily, that even the de-constructivist, as well as the constructively eclectic current of the post-history could envy it. Each era of the nearly two hundred year long history of the left wing are being treated with post-modernist arbitrariness by the theoreticians of the Third Way.

Thus, the Third Way can step forward as a reformer of the welfare state. This is the point, where we might tend to forget, that the welfare state has already been destroyed by Reagan’s and Thatcher’s neoliberalism; The Third Way could only have the chance of reorganizing the remained but quite moderate wrecks of it – and also to legitimate this destruction on behalf of the Universal Social Democracy<sup>1</sup>.

Such an eclectic treatment of the historical and objective dimensions is also sure to help the conspicuous verbalism characteristic of the Third way in general (and also

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<sup>1</sup> Historically doubtful remarks are often strongly tendencious – what we should think when we read in a text e. g. that the industrial society had never been so “dominant” in the history than many think, because there had always been active small-scale manufacturers and contractors...



from several other perspectives)<sup>2</sup>, which at this point should be called after all triumphant verbalism. Blair prefers to use the expression “strong family”. But if we want to see through the curtain of verbliness, we may find, that one component of a “strong family” is the “civil society” lacking any stricter definition.

One significant common characteristic of the concepts of the Third Way is the argument with the values. On this field also, several objectivations could be raised. One (this?) characteristic is defining the theory of “values” of the Third Way, considering the deepest character of the whole current, and it also defines most deeply the political goals. New values of the Third Way, value-based attacks of rival currents, an explanation of the new political situation through new values, and thus the whole value-oriented nature of the Third Way prove to be a basically incomplete approach, for they build values in functional connections of the whole of the modern society and its sub-systems so.

They talk about values in every way runs without any connections of objects or contents. But a discourse of values put this way is doomed to be almost totally arbitrary. A new concept cannot be built upon new values, but only upon new interpretations of political, economical, social processes and international politics, which of course bring changes into the system and relations of values. A re-evaluation of values without new recognitions is a superficial activity which only affects the surface, and it cannot promise any greater results.

Such a rectilinear separation of values and analyses of contents and functions brings of course some intellectual and practical benefits concerning the actual goal of the Third Way, for without any connections of functions or contents many do not realize, how the real values of the Third Way, in an unrecognizable way, look like the basic values of the neoliberalism<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> In a paradoxical way, sometimes it happens that because of the blurriness of historical and objective measures, even a useful and productive thought may lose its sharper outlines. Thus for example the idea that every public expense should create perceivable reforms and apparent improvement, becomes insecurely outlined if the objective components of the concept are not clear, i. e. if possible scopes of interpretation of long- and short term, minority and majority, common and individual interest, national and supranational interest are not made clear, as the original statement (“each public expense should bring apparent improvement”) shall have completely different meanings and contents at each significant concrete distribution of these aspects. Of course, even this, on its own totally irreproachable statement means practically overshadowing less beneficial possibilities and long-term thinking in general.

<sup>3</sup> In a programmatic writing (The Third Way), Tony Blair gives an excellent example for the way this current is treating the values. Then he names four basic values (equality, equality of chances, responsibility, community), some of which are either entirely of neo-liberal content and origin (equality, equality of chances), or they become like that in a concrete interpretation. A quite élatant example for this is the “value” of the responsibility, which is meant to describe the fact that there are socially supported people who use help without return, without “responsibility”. This is a real problem, we just do not see why it would be a task of an unemployed person to find oneself a “responsible” activity; we do not see either, why Blair connects this (with a neoliberal touch) with an attack against the old left wing. But even this is exceeded by the value of “community”, which at first sight is really not of a neo-liberal accent, what Blair is however trying to make accepted in the way he considers the state intervention as acceptable only in the case of the self-



However the Third Way's ideas about values have a side which is also relevant in a comparison with the neoliberalism. Namely, we had to state, up to now, that leading values, either directly or concerning their interpretation, are of a neoliberal kind. We also had to mention the fact that the secret gravity of the Third Way is to acquire the political control over the new nation-state and supra-national structures that are to be built upon neoliberal bases.

While the classical (political) neoliberalism in the present circumstances (standing on neoliberal economical and political bases) does not want, is not even able, to promise anything about solving or even reducing conflicts, that might emerge in the system, the "right politics" of the Third Way is still a promise after all, even if – of course – we would be aware of the new results of analyses of functions and contents behind the movement of the values, when also grounding these values<sup>4</sup>.

The short-term objective of the Third Way is obvious: it wants to take away the political control of the today's world from the neoliberalism (or political representatives of the neoliberalism, mainly conservatives). But at the same time they do not articulate content – and function related bases of the social operation to change (to be changed). This desired political hegemony therefore relies on a deep identity. No wonder that not a single concept of the Third Way tries hard to indicate superficial differences<sup>5</sup>.

The Third Way is a supra-national offer, also an integrating integration. The Third Way also makes great integration processes part of the concept of the permanent revision.

After a world-wide victory over the existing socialism, the neoliberalism emerged as a victorious complex system. The same victory of the existing socialism shocked in the same way the international social democracy and put it in front of new choices.

The Third Way is the answer of the social democracy to the new situation. An answer that offers a long-term partnership, if we want, a political marriage to the neoliberalism of an economical and political world order, which is already considered as hegemonic. In this case, there is a difference between the marriage share of each "spouse».

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supporting operation of the local communities "is not being set back". The definitions of the state are especially sensible in the concepts of the Third Way, as the pronouncement of these functions would like to differ from the neoliberalism in a positive way, while the first concrete definitions are unmistakably already of a neoliberal kind (another example: an interpretation considering the regulation of the "competition" as a most important function of the state).

<sup>4</sup> This "promising-nothing" character of the neoliberalism puts it in a new light, why its victory got interwoven with the fall of the communism. No matter how unfortunate e.g. one self-definition ("permanent revisionalism") of the Third Way might be, the neoliberalism arriving at the peak of the best worlds, cannot promise such a thing. Though the acknowledgement of other possibilities, we may mention here an element of the new rhetoric of the Third Way, according to which while taking neoliberal values, sometimes they consider the "attractivity" of the declining neoliberalism, sometimes they consider it straight as politically dead.

<sup>5</sup> In Blair, the radical and doctrinal neoliberalism endangers "the unity of the nation" – an argument that the continental representatives of the Third Way could hardly include in their arguments, although its everyday political significance is quite clear.

The triumphant neoliberalism can wait historically. Its operation does not directly depend on the tone of the political system of institutions that ensures hegemony, while the social democracy is sure to get to an acting constraint by a succession of quick changes. The Third Way practically means the total acceptance of neoliberal basic values. Non-neoliberal values (we intentionally do not speak about “left-wing” values) only appear on the level of the rhetoric, of the triumphant verbalism, of the verbal victories.

### **Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Monetarism**

The liberalism applies, in the true sense of the word, as an “endless” topic of the political and politological debate after 1989, which date is identical with a victory of the liberalism not considered in the strict sense of political party. It don't mean that the liberalism would not have remained generally valid as the common denominator and global discourse of these years (Dahrendorf, 1990a; Dahrendorf, 1990b; Kiss, 1997, pp. 33–41).

The liberalism appears in every point and as a personification of every value in the current discussions. In its environment, descriptive and normative, or value relative positions are mixing endless.

The greatest problem in the present, explicit or latent, to set the liberalism identical to the monetarist economical system. Our attempt would like to argue intensively against this fusion attempt, namely first of all, by interest of clarity of terms.

Every reduction of the classical liberalism is immediately a great problem. However, such possibilities can however all too well appear, for the liberalism, despite its apparently so simple and so transparent baselines is a bundle of numerous “freedoms”. L.T. Hobhouse judges, that all the following “freedoms” as elements of the liberalism as constitutive for a legitimate notion of the liberalism: “civil”, “fiscal”, “individual”, “social”, “economical”, “domestic”, “local”, “racial”, “national”, “international”, “political” and the “people's sovereignty” concerned freedoms (Hobhouse, 1994). The liberalism stands effectively, and indeed because of a logical necessity, constrained to represent all freedoms, or to defend them. Therefore, it is always critical when orientations and concepts presented as “liberal”, proceed as “reductive” in their freedom's understanding. Every reduction of the liberalism has a critical effect on the whole concerned vision. It appears as logical that, from this vision also the specific reduction of the liberalism / neoliberalism on the system of the monetarism is illegitimate.

Precisely the really existing socialism of the 70-s and 80-s averred as the subject against which a classical political liberalism of the human rights and a new economical liberalism, appearing against the national redistribution and essentially thinking in the strict sense “monetaristically”, could unit. The end of the real socialism created this complex of the new monetaristic worldwide complex, while through its existence it united two original concepts, which had very little to do with each other. It was precisely the real socialism, in front of a true hermeneutical horizon of the classical, economical and political discussion of a liberalism founded on the human rights, also a strongly represented “liberalism” of the monetary restriction and of a new attitude oriented against the central redistribution, could appear as both sides of a lonely medal.

The counterproof can be easily done. Only on the field of the western politics, it was rather so, that the liberals motivated by the human rights should have rather behave against the monetary restriction. No miracle that the penetration of this economic politics be implemented on this western field by extremely right and conservative politicians.

Only the system of the declining real socialism was therefore the only optimal political field, in which the “liberalism” of the criticism of the etatistic redistribution did not immediately lead in the relation of the cognitive dissonance to the classic liberalism of the human rights. Precisely in this system the criticism of the extremely strong central redistribution itself has still carried classical liberal trains of the “free game of the free forces”.

The real socialism has not “misunderstood” this new situation. It has simply not recognized it. It has not seen that its pure existence made possible a crucial and deadly regrouping of forces and ideologies and supplied, like on a running track, the precedent cases, which have always splendidly confirmed the new categorization.

The world-historical relevant post-communist liberalism united in this way the elements of the classical liberalism and of the monetary liberalism. A union of the liberal description of the political reality and social reality with the monetary description of the same is today a worldwide phenomenon and this represents the current most problematic reduction of the liberalism. The tacit comparison of the liberalism with the monetarism does not apply only as an incorrect official version; it is also simultaneously very much misleading.

Under “monetarism”, we understand an homogenous and coherent, also a political-economical system running homogeneously and coherently, which comes back to three relevant subsystems, namely to an economical system (mainly, monetary-economical), which is largely determined by the phenomenon of the inside and outside indebtedness of the states, to the political system of the liberal democracy and to an hegemony of post-modern values in the everyday life. About this complex, we formulate the thesis, that it might hardly be generally designed as “liberalism”.

It has to be considered first, that the stricter economical politics of the monetary restriction has not even once by chance been imposed by “liberal” political forces, while it forgot thoroughly, that many social classes and components of this redistribution have been motivated and implemented not by kryptoleft ideologists, but – formerly – by the necessities of the so-called consumer society.

Considered from the centre of the modern economy, there is not always antagonistic conflict between monetary restriction and state redistribution. From its perspective, these moments are two successive conceptions of the economical politics. Not less astonishing is that Reagan or Thatcher appear today with the steady necessity of the concept usage also as liberal facing the general public. In this perception of the monetary complex as “normal” is the illegitimate comparison of the monetary complex with the liberalism ignored.

The most essential argument is that the monetary complex together with its three components of the liberal basic vision is of the “free game of the free forces”. The term “liberal” must appear here as a clear imposture.

The monetary complex reduces the social space of the “free game” of many (if it just does not destroy it), introduces in a lot of points of the economical

regulation such an extreme financial centralization, that it cannot thereby any longer be considered as part of the liberal field.

Its conception of the state is once again not fundamental. While it diminishes its social functions in every sense, it evolves a bureaucracy in the sensible money-economical fields, which practically never existed in “normal” liberal democracies. With this demolishing of the social sphere, we must always keep in mind the fine difference, that the demolishing due to the indebtedness will be carried out by the monetary complex!

The essential of this act consists in the fact that the great monetary complex is willing to break numerous taboos or to encourage their elimination. The demolishing of certain social achievements can be understood also as a simple fiscal-monetary act, the concerning facts are however, on the other hand, social taboos, which were at least valid since the 2000 years of the European civilization.

According to this reflection, we can see already rather differently the term “demolishing of the social state networks”. In this breaking of taboos the exigence of description “liberalism” can also no longer be taken entirely seriously, because the liberalism understands the “free play of the free forces” always in an emancipative sense.

In this world of the monetary complex, the whole subsystem of the politics is radically depreciated. The politician is a man, who can and must certainly promise a lot before the vote, from his own force, however, has no chance to break the activities of the monetary complex and his highest and most complex duty is, to select the circle in a legitimated way which will be the victim of the next restrictive measures.

The designation “liberalism” for the great monetary complex is – apart from the horizon of the really existing socialism – on this basis an imposture.

The only really existing relation is a simple coexistence which is, however, not fateful and metaphysical. This is the true relation and it is the one of the coexistence, for this coexistence can in principle be interrupted by both sides. We take the cases, in which the strict monetary complex could also productively exist together with the conservative variants of the same democracy, but also with the conservative variants of non-democratic political systems (fascism, post-communism).

The great monetary complex has been up to now still described very incomplete, although it represents a well and adequately perceptible subject for the economy, as well as for politics, but also still for the society. It presents itself as “economical politics” of liberal colour, although it is not only not “liberal”, but in the strict sense of the word is also no “economical politics”, for it has in the strict sense only little to do with the economy.

It is an “economical politics” or “political economy”, which takes care exclusively of the financial transactions, with special attention to the “soft” organs of the national financial affairs, with which through the double indebtedness of the state always big money flows can be transferred from the state sphere to other spheres, it is not, because in these state spheres the need for these resources does not exist any more, but from the more simpler and more frappant reason, that these resources become simply transferrable under given circumstances.

For this reason, the monetary complex is, in its way, an “economical politics”; its economical component can also get a little free from the politics, like its political

component from the economical. The fact that we have here to do with a new mix of economy and politics has to be mentioned. Every monetary (economical) step is political, every monetary (political) step is economical. The monetary complex has to do with economy and society only in borderline cases.

This is the logical consequence in case of a great complex, which can also unite so inextricably politics and economy, that it deploys its own language, which is not “only” a language, but a new statement of the concepts with the contents. So the language of the great monetary complex forgets every difference between the macro and the micro level of the processes, which consequently follows from, that schoolmistresses and nurses, through their renunciation to their “request for consumption goods”, accompany the debts of armies, heavy industries or hydroelectric works. So a state of the fiscal balance appears for the monetary language as a “surplus consumption”, even if in the country in question the lower limit of a western consumption level has not even been reached.

The monetarism alleges, that it “reacts” to a new social state, which can be described metaphorically as a “social disease”. However, in fact, the monetarism is itself a social disease, it has so little to do namely with real economical processes, with social taboos and with the real objectives of the liberal basic vision, that this categorization must appear as illegitim.

The adequate perception of the great monetary complex applied long – in politics as well as in the economy – as an independent problem. This problematic of perception is so difficult, because the great monetary complex offers several faces simultaneously for the society. The destructive character of the great monetary complex appears partly always in certain steps, which are apparently not linked to each other. On the other hand, these attacks and monetary incursions always appear in the impeccable ideology of the neoliberal rationality.

This diversity of the social image of the great monetary complex becomes even greater – we think of the fact that the monetary bulldozer sometimes exterminates the social institutions, which are effectively mature for the decline and no more rational. Some legitimate strokes make of course these actions of the monetarism generally not legitimate. However, immediately on the other hand, beside the successful rationalization acts “against will”, other faces of the great monetary complex are appearing, namely the one of the brutality almost unprecedented in the peaceful decades and the one at nothing-step back, which are to be observed easily in these attacks against the (own, but also extraneous) society.

We have already shortly approached the problematic of this fracture of the taboos, due to this brutality the political context is more essential at the moment. The thought is not at all to be excluded, of how many societies shaken by crises would have survived to their fatal diseases, if they had allowed or might had allowed themselves this brutality, which the great monetary complex is practicing. At this point of the problematization of the monetary fracture of the taboos, which we already have thought about, they were no longer to be broken in the “modern” history, the idea raises, that the ideology and the background of this fracture of the taboos has just been the anticommunism (Ehrke, 2004). It remains, however, the question whether the attack directed against the dying real socialism has been effectively legitimized, to support and favor this attack ideologically. It remains, above all, the paradox that the anticommunism has effectively won, when it formulated this aim only as an ideological phenomenon

and admitted most astonishingly the effective end of the communism (Kaempfer, Neidhöfer, Ternes, 2005).

Do we have now the functional face of the monetarism in the eyes, the picture changes itself again necessarily. Appears the picture of the “everyday” monetarism (Peck, 2010). There is not namely every day a naval battle, there is also not every day any monetary attack, there is everyday life, as there has always been the every day life in front of the monetarism. The monetary incursion does not occur every day.

The great monetary complex does not define itself. It has no subject, or no subjects which bear him. The great monetary complex goes together with the supremacy of certain values; it might be understood as a direct consequence of them. It modifies all subsystems, without they would themselves stop to be. The great monetary complex presents itself such as the “normality” and, as such, as something that cannot be affirmed only from the liberal point of view, but as something that is carried by liberal principles.

### **The Other, the Otherness, the Interculturality**

Up to this time, the perpetually broadening discourse about the Other, Otherness, and Interculturality was considered an “open way”, i. e. as part of an extension of emancipation. This orientation of the discourse prevailed with the overwhelming power of self-evidence, thus it became part of the international discussion right in this self-evident and self-fulfilling manner.

In our present time, the same discourse acquires new accents, while the former ones are still present to some extent as well. Beyond this former approach stood a fully emancipated logic of identity in a generalized form, which interpreted the Other and Otherness in a double manner of inclusion. Firstly, this approach wholly accepted the different character of the Other and the Otherness. And secondly, at the same time, it saw in them an entity genuinely identical with its original, “identical” entity. It does it in a programmatically emancipative sense.

The turn from a logic of identity to a logic of difference is anchored in the dramatic change of background dimensions. The approach of identity, which opens itself and sublates (*aufheben*) the Other and the Otherness is not founded by any kind of particular identity. The fact that this logic of identity had been based upon all-human (and not particular) values, which had been interpreted as the values of a civilization, has obviously disappeared from the consciousness of present actors. The attitude towards the Other in the light of identity therefore grounded the universality of the matter of civilizatory values.

This is the context, in which the shift from the logic of identity to the logic of difference took place. To call the present change its proper name, it is to say that the shift took place from a logic of identity to a logic of difference, which was no more built upon all-human i. e. civilizatory values.

The classical basic model of interculturality defined this way is therefore built upon difference, and arrives to an idea of identity, which is built upon civilizatory values, as the founding forces of identity. This process become crucial for our time. It's a transfiguration of the whole discourse on interculturality, which ended up in a logic of difference.



A logic of difference, which cannot be derived to an option of some common all-human values, necessarily constructs also a new reality of a new and different kind. The supposed triumph is unmasked as a huge challenge. A logic of difference is not rooted in any possible logic of identity possesses a peculiar quality. It has not yet been completely examined so far. What makes the situation even more confuse is the fact that difference – and the logic of difference even more – has been evolving for a long time in the same positive connotation as the emancipation itself. Up to this time, the semantics of difference has been an excellent and emancipative one – it was the semantics of the acceptance (Anerkennung) of the Other (s). Long decades have passed in terms of difference with a perpetually extending liberalization and emancipation, while identity, especially in context of interculturality, acquired homogenizing, if not straight totalitarian traits.

In the century of totalitarian dictatorships, the logic of identity got consequently corrupted, because the decisive difference between a logic of identity with civilizatory and all-human foundation and the same logic without civilizatory and all-human foundation has not been materialized. This provides an illuminating example of how the shadows of totalitarianism can eliminate real all-human values when the political community lacks a sufficient reflective basis.

Today, the logic of difference is actually fully represented by the leading philosophical tendencies of our time. The logic of difference becomes the instructive idea of ruling philosophical approaches of our global world. Terms like “progress”, “development”, “developing country”, “reflex-modernization”, “backwardness” keep their common sociological, economical, or historical meaning of course, without being able to offer the individuals a proper frame of social practice. The “Other” or “Otherness” gets anchored and even all-sidedly acknowledged by the logic of difference, but the Other and the Otherness shall no more function as a basis for constructive dynamical processes by generating positive and all-human values.

The developed party in the logic of difference does not consciously emphasize its civilizatory advance any more. The undeveloped party (the Other or the Different) does not intend to catch up with the civilizatory advance, while it is happy about this respectful attitude. The logic of difference don't exclude mutual respect, but it excludes real historical progression.

During this transfiguration of the problem of the Other, Otherness and Interculturality, tribalism, magic residues, or other archaisms of pre-individual attitudes still remain active.

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