

Part III

Interdisciplinary Integration of Public Law and Social Sciences: Problems and Solutions

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The Natural State – A Filter on the Bivalent Boolean Algebra of Natural Law (On the Unsatisfactory State of Affairs in the “Theory” of Natural Law over the Last Few Centuries on This Planet)

Abstract. The study focuses on natural law as a system of *formally defined* laws, specifically examining the *algebraic aspect* of this system. Its goal is to complement the well-known “theory” of natural law with the lesser-known theory of the *natural state*. In the precise definition of the natural state, animals of the species “*Homo sapiens*” are not mentioned at all (they are only a *specific case*), and the natural state appears as an *abstract, idealized concept* within natural law theory, which is *necessarily subjected to mathematization*. Methodologically, the study relies on *mathematical modeling*. The novelty of this research lies in the fact that it adds a precisely defined concept of the *natural state* to the *bivalent algebraic* system (of *formally defined laws*) of *formal axiology* within natural law. The natural state serves as a *filter applied to the bivalent Boolean algebra of natural law*. In this context, the terms “algebraic system”, “algebra”, and “filter” (specifically, ultrafilter) are used in their *formal, mathematical (algebraic) sense*, rather than in a metaphorical or vague manner.

Keywords: bivalent algebra of natural law; filter as a strictly algebraic concept; natural state as an abstract idealized object of the theory of natural law; filter on the bivalent Boolean algebra of natural law; formal definition of the laws of natural law

This article deals with current theoretical issues in *public law*. Unlike private law, *public law is state law*. It addresses many specific issues that represent responses to contemporary challenges. However, public law also includes *fundamental theoretical* issues studied within the “science of the state” (*Staatswissenschaft*). One of these issues is the subject of this article. In legal positivism, the necessary connection between the concepts of “state” and “law” is complemented by the necessary connection of these concepts in legal naturalism. The mutual supplementation of positivism and naturalism (their symmetry) within the general philosophy of law requires the introduction of a “strange”, unconventional concept – the “natural state” – and the strict formal definition of its content in strictly formally defined terms of a *discrete mathematical model* of natural law, namely, a *bivalent algebra* of natural law.

Rebelling against a thousand-year tradition, the founder of modern physics, Galileo Galilei, was firmly convinced that *the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics*. The surprising truth of Galileo’s heuristically significant thesis, which scandalized the cultured people of his time, helps explain a fact that may seem curious to the modern educated person: that for centuries, from Aristotle to Galileo, all “physicists” were pure humanists (“poets”) who explored nature on a metaphysical level, using only natural language to compose *poetic works* often titled “On Nature”. It was Galileo, fluent in the special language in which the “Book of Nature” is written, who laid the foundations of modern physics (and natural science as a whole) as a science in the true sense of the word. In my opinion, there is a *similar* situation around *natural law*: paraphrasing Galileo, one could say that the strictly formally defined, universally necessary and immutable laws of natural law – the Laws of Nature – are precisely formulated in the special language of mathematics. Therefore, lawyers, the overwhelming majority of whom do not know this special language and have no desire to learn it, cannot (and are unwilling to) read or understand the Book of the Law of Nature.

However, in fairness, it should be noted that not all well-known philosophers and professional lawyers had minimal mathematical expertise or underestimated the role of mathematics in the progressive development of human culture – be it philosophical, moral-legal, artistic-aesthetic, religious-metaphysical, or culture as a whole. An obvious exception from this rule was the *lawyer* and academic G.W. Leibniz – a genius of mathematical and logical creativity. He approached mathematics, logic, and the philosophy of law, particularly natural law, with creativity, striving to achieve the highest possible advancements of his time. His works include, for instance, the unfinished “Elements of Natural Law” (Leibniz 1971), a work that remains untranslated from Latin into Russian to this day. Other prominent philosophers of the so-called golden age of natural law, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, also demonstrated a serious interest in and respect for both mathematics and natural law theory (see: Hobbes 1936; Locke 1988; Montesquieu 1999). Historians and legal theorists rightly consider this era (17th and 18th centuries) important for the development of legal naturalism (see: d’Entrevies 1951; Finnis 1980; Finnis 1991; Pokrovsky 1998: 62). This period was crucial for the progressive development of the natural law doctrine. Unfortunately, although this era was favorable for natural law theory, mathematics had not yet matured into the realization of itself as a universal *theory of abstract mathematical structures*, and concepts like set theory, Boolean algebra, and universal algebra were yet to be discovered. This limited mathematical development explains why attempts to create *discrete mathematical models of natural law* either were not undertaken or were unsuccessful.

An extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs in both the study and teaching of the “theory” of natural law has persisted on this planet for millennia, from Antiquity to the present day. By the 20th century, mathematics had matured enough to serve as an adequate language and method for the theory of natural law, but legal positivism continued to dominate the philosophy of law. The lack of alignment between the development of the mathematical and legal subsystems of human culture grew more pronounced, eventually resembling an almost insurmountable divide.

In the early 20th century, Oswald Spengler paid particular attention to this significant deficiency in the development

of the culture of *Homo sapiens*, becoming the first to show the connections between the main corresponding stages of the historical development of humanity's distinct legal and mathematical cultures (Spengler 1928: 67, 82). He wrote: "The affinity between mathematical and legal thought is very close" (Spengler 1928: 67). In his opinion, it would take humanity about a hundred years, or at least the entire twentieth century, to overcome the obvious discrepancy (a significant gap, a chasm) between these *objectively interconnected cultures* (Spengler 1928: 83). However, Spengler's predictions proved overly optimistic: his ideas were either misunderstood or understood but ignored, and eventually forgotten.

Thus, unfortunately, over the past centuries, "legal" (philosophical-legal) discussions on natural law have turned into murky streams of purely humanitarian consciousness and are conducted in exclusively natural language: the debaters do not seek to express themselves clearly or to clarify for their interlocutors the precise meanings of the words and phrases used, making actual mutual understanding and agreement, as well as actual mutual understanding and disagreement, highly unlikely.

In the professional language of Roman jurists, the phrase "natural law" did not have the meaning it has been given in recent centuries: the "reception" of Roman law was accompanied by its peculiar interpretation, explanation, and editing, in particular, "trimming the excess" with the Occam's razor. This gradual *qualitative change in the meaning* of the term "natural law" was duly noted by Rousseau (Rousseau 1998; Rousseau 1994: 330), but jurists, especially philosophers of his time, ignored this remark: they gradually began to use the phrase "natural law" not in the medieval (antique) sense but in a fundamentally different one (Kareev 1902: 7-8). Unlike such renowned Roman jurists as Ulpian and Paul (see: Peretersky 1984: 23-25), in classical German philosophy (and parallel in national philosophies of law in other civilized countries), the subjects of natural law were declared to be only *rational beings*, that is, God and animals of the species *Homo sapiens*. Not only bacteria but all other living beings (even highly intelligent animals such as dolphins and chimpanzees) were denied natural legal subjectivity due to their lack of "reason". Not too long ago (in the Middle Ages), not only were bulls and pigs *accused of killing humans* and often sentenced to

the most severe *punishment (the death penalty)*, but even caterpillars were considered subjects of natural law and had rights to be *defendants, represented by attorneys, convicted, and even excommunicated* (Kantorovich 2012).

From time to time, there has been a renewed interest in the doctrine of natural law in the history of legal philosophy. Although most professional jurists of the past two centuries were convinced that this meaningless *metaphysical chimera* was absolutely dead, some lawyers called for its revival and reanimation (Stammler 1907; Stammler 1908; Hessen 1902; Novgorodtsev 1902; Novgorodtsev 1904a; Novgorodtsev 1904b; Pokrovsky 1909; Pokrovsky 1998: 60-76; Petrazhitsky 1913; Trubetskoy 1907; Kistyakovsky 1998), while others had principled objections to such revival (Kareev 1902; Kovalevsky 1902).

However, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, under the strong influence of Kantian philosophy of morality and law, supporters of the so-called revived natural law had in mind its “trimmed” version – a “*kingdom of reason*” described in *purely natural* language. They were convinced that lawyers equipped with modern scientific theory could no longer be held responsible for the nonsense spoken by their Roman colleague Ulpian about natural law as necessarily universal and immutable, a law of nature uniting all people not only with all animals but with all forms of life (Kareev 1902: 2, 15; Kovalevsky 1902: 33, 62-63).

In fairness, it should be noted that in the 19th century, a doctrine based on *scientific knowledge of biology* – the theory of “mutual aid among animals” – stood in direct contradiction to the aforementioned critical (and demonstrably dismissive) attitude toward Ulpian’s natural law concept, characteristic of modern times (Kropotkin 1904: 3-50). Prince P. Kropotkin, who developed an anarchist theory of state and law, argued that animals have a sense of justice; he claimed that in “the animal world, society has been found at all stages of evolution” (Kropotkin 1904: 39). His ideas, shocking to the average 19th-century jurist, closely aligned with what Ulpian once wrote about natural law (which should be common to humans and animals, uniting all living things). Critically re-evaluating and correcting the extremes of Darwinism, the rebellious prince insisted that “sociality is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle” (Kropotkin 1904: 6); mutual aid, he argued,

is “a law of nature and the main factor of evolution” (Kropotkin 1904: 7). In my opinion, Kropotkin’s original, dissident reflections on “animal communities”, on the “social life of animals” based on “mutual aid for the benefit of all members of the community” (Kropotkin 1904: 6), can be considered important historical precursors to the formation of an *abstract, idealized theoretical construct* that may be called a “natural state” and is necessarily connected with the *theoretically defined concept* of “natural law” (*within the algebra of actions*).

The presence in nature not only of struggle but also of “solidarity” and social alliances among living beings, specifically “animal societies” or “societies of animals”, was also discussed by M.M. Kovalevsky, with a reference to A. Comte (Kovalevsky 1902: 34, 45-48). Kovalevsky was critical of the concept of “revived natural law” (Kovalevsky 1902: 33, 62-63). In his analysis of Comte’s sociological ideas, he even discussed the latter’s assertion regarding the existence of “peculiar societies characteristic of lower organisms” (Kovalevsky 1902: 47).

The intellectual movement that became known as “revived natural law” in the early 20th century ultimately led nowhere – essentially, it was much ado about nothing. No coherent theory of natural law emerged from it, neither as an abstract theory nor as one that aimed for any kind of universality. P.I. Novgorodtsev acknowledged this disappointing fact with the following statement: “If we take those names and works that are often cited in connection with the revival of natural law, it turns out that in the major theoretical works of our time, the problem of natural law was not only undeveloped but rather dismissed and replaced by other issues” (Novgorodtsev 1913: 18).

Why did a *genuinely scientific theory of natural law* – a *precisely formulated system of immutable and necessarily universal, formally defined laws* – fail to emerge at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries? And was there ever, in principle, any real possibility of its emergence within the limits of that historically constrained intellectual movement? In my opinion, there was no such possibility: the “dead” or long “dormant” doctrine of natural law could not be revived or restored by the efforts of Stammler, Hessen, Novgorodtsev, Pokrovsky, Petrazhitsky, Kistyakovsky, and company; their desperate attempt was doomed to fail. Undoubtedly, such

a critical view requires justification. Let us consider the following arguments.

According to the philosophy of science, a theory is a logically organized system of laws – that is, *necessary* and *general* statements about its objects; a theory must systematically ignore random details and specific cases, concentrating instead on its objects in the broadest, most general terms. A theory does not directly relate to material objects of the real world; rather, it directly pertains to its *abstract, idealized objects*; if such objects do not yet exist, then neither does a theory. Novgorodtsev and the other scholars mentioned above were largely unaware of this.

According to the theory of positive law, a necessary attribute of a true legal law is its strict *formal definiteness*. Legal positivism justifiably emphasizes the strict *formal definiteness* of positive law norms, in contrast to the “laws of natural law” referenced (and formulated in an exceedingly ambiguous natural philosophical language) throughout centuries of political and legal thought. Regarding the vaguely formulated “theory” of natural law expressed in purely natural language over many previous centuries, S.S. Alekseev rightly notes: “...the categories of natural law... lack the qualities of strict definiteness – the decisive and unique merit of legal regulation” (Alekseev 2010: 337).

However, in my opinion, the scope of truth of this quite justified remark has both historical and logical boundaries, beyond which it is no longer valid. In the third quarter of the 20th century, the situation changed significantly: in the early 1970s, a *bivalent algebra of actions and agents* (individual or collective – it doesn’t matter) emerged. For the first time in history, the doctrine of natural law was precisely formulated in a *clear, artificial language*; the concept of “natural law” was given a strict (explicit and precise) formal definition within the *algebraic system of natural law as formal axiology*. From this historical moment onward, the critique of a lack (or insufficiency) of strict formal definiteness in the laws of natural law is no longer relevant (Lobovikov 2022: 81). Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of contemporary legal scholars are unaware of this. This circumstance highlights the importance of creating, progressively developing, and effectively applying a *fundamentally new* (modern) theory of natural law as formal axiology – a necessarily mathematized theory whose universal laws

are characterized by formal definiteness and immutability (to a far greater degree than those of positive law) despite the obvious empirical facts of the variability and relativity of evaluative judgments (Lobovikov 2022: 81). These evident facts of variability and relativity in evaluations do not contradict the eternal (immutable), necessarily universal, *formally defined* laws of the bivalent Boolean algebra of natural law.

The novelty of this research lies not in discussing the *strict formal definition* of laws within the *Boolean algebra of natural law*, which is quite unconventional for legal positivists, but in proposing the concept of “natural state” as an essential step for advancing the modern, mathematically-oriented theory of natural law. In my opinion, this psychologically unexpected (and potentially shocking for standard legal positivists) theoretical concept should somehow be integrated into the existing *discrete mathematical model of natural law* – namely, the algebra of formal axiology (Lobovikov 2002; Lobovikov 2022). This does not concern the empirical search, discovery, or sensory perception of the natural state (an *abstract, idealized object* of theory) in the material world, but rather the invention (intentional abstract-theoretical construction) of a *particular algebraic structure* closely related to the already existing algebraic system of natural law as formal axiology.

In both academic and educational literature on the theory of state and law, the view that *law and the state are necessarily interconnected* is, if not universally accepted, then at least clearly dominant. There are no fundamental disagreements on this point between respected theorists of state and law in the West (Kelsen 2007) and in the East (Alekseev 2015): virtually all respectable professional jurists in civilized countries recognize that the *state is the source and guarantor of the implementation of law*. However, this refers to positive law, created exclusively by people specifically authorized by the positive state, which itself is an *organization artificially created by people alone*. The term “natural law” is used by almost all legal theorists, whether frequently or rarely, explicitly or implicitly (see, e.g.: Alekseev 2015; Kelsen 2007). In contrast, the term “natural state” is either entirely absent or appears very rarely, revealing a clear asymmetry. To address this asymmetry, we need to acknowledge that there are systems in nature that can be called “*natural states*” – *sources of natural law, suitable forms for*

its existence, and effective means for its implementation. This unusual (psychologically unexpected for legal positivists) thesis was first presented over 20 years ago at the conference “The Logic of Tolerance and Law” (Yekaterinburg, December 24–25, 2001) and was subsequently published in the conference proceedings (Lobovikov 2002). Unfortunately, there was no response, although, in my opinion, this rather non-trivial philosophical and legal thesis deserves discussion among specialists in the philosophy of law, as it touches on significant aspects of the general theory of law and state.

Now, it is appropriate to move from substantive philosophical and legal discussions presented in the vague and ambiguous natural language to precise definitions of the natural-law concepts under discussion, using the completely unambiguous artificial language of mathematics. If we define *a natural state as a filter within a bivalent Boolean algebra of actions (or acts) and agents*, then what exactly does “filter on a Boolean algebra” mean? The following quote provides an answer to this question:

“A filter on a Boolean algebra M is a non-empty subset $D \subseteq M$ that satisfies the following conditions:

- (1) $x, y \in D \Rightarrow (x \cap y) \in D$,
- (2) $x \in D, x \leq y \Rightarrow y \in D$,
- (3) $x \in D \Rightarrow (-x) \notin D$.

A filter D on a Boolean algebra M is called an *ultrafilter* if it satisfies the following condition:

- (4) $x \in D$ or $(-x) \in D$ for any $x \in M$.

A filter D on a Boolean algebra M is called *simple* if it satisfies the condition: for any $x, y \in M$.

- (5) $(x \cup y) \in D \Rightarrow x \in D$ or $y \in D$.

A filter D on a Boolean algebra M is called *maximal* if it is not contained in any other filter on M ” (Lavrov, Maksimova 1975: 22). Precise definitions of the concept of a “filter on Boolean algebra” can also be found in the works of P.M. Kon, D.A. Vladimirov, and A.I. Maltsev (Kon 1968: 212; Vladimirov 1969: 39; Maltsev 1970: 193).

In my opinion, a crucial concept for those using mathematical modeling methods in rational philosophical and legal discussions

about the “City of God” (Aurelius Augustinus 1998) and the notion of a “natural state”, which is necessary for modern theory of natural law, is “**Theorem 2.7:** *Every filter of a Boolean algebra is contained in an ultrafilter*” (Kon 1968: 212).

To facilitate the understanding of the above, let us consider the following graphical model. Let the symbol M represent the set of either good or bad actions (acts) and actors (agents), depicted by the gray quadrilateral below, on which the *bivalent Boolean algebra of natural law is based*. The symbol T denotes a subset of set M (represented by a circle within the quadrilateral) that is confined to a specific time (epoch), space (territory), and the people living in that time and place, effectively controlling that territory in the given time period.




Fig. 1. *Positive state T*, defined on the set of actors and acts

Figure 1 presents the *positive* state T, defined by territory, history, and people: this refers to a definition that does not use evaluative categories of natural law, such as “good” and “just”. In other words, Figure 1 graphically models the *positivist* definition of the state T, which steers clear of the concepts of good and evil.

Is it possible to visualize (represent through a graphical model) the precise formal definition of the abstract concept of “*natural state*” given above? In my opinion, it is. Let us consider the *natural state* in territory T. If all good (actions or individuals) are marked in white, and bad in black, the subset of T in the gray circle, belonging to the set M (modeled by the gray quadrilateral), would look as follows:




Fig. 2. The *natural* state T as a filter on the bivalent Boolean algebra of natural law

The white circle inside the quadrilateral models the *natural state* T. In full accordance with the precise formal definition of the abstract concept of “natural state” provided above, this (white) circle represents a set whose elements are all and *only* good acts and actors belonging to the set T. There are no black elements in the natural state T; they have been “filtered out” and are exclusively concentrated in the subset of T that is highlighted in black.

The mathematically precise *natural law* definition of the concept of “state” does not contradict the existing positive legal definition; instead, they complement each other, creating a harmonious conceptual synthesis. For example, the presumption of innocence – a key element of positivist legal technique – fits perfectly with the notion that, in a natural state, only good acts and actors exist, while bad ones are “filtered out” elsewhere. Similarly, in a positive state, all actors are considered innocent according to this presumption. However, if an actor is found guilty by a court, he/she is subsequently “filtered out” by the state to another place.

It is clear that the concept of the “*natural state*” discussed in this article – defined as “*a filter on the Boolean algebra of actions and agents (subjects)*” – is not inherently connected to concepts such as “reason”, “rational beings”, “natural intelligence”, “human”, “God”, and so on. While such a connection is *possible*, it is *incidental* and represents only a specific case. Therefore, when discussing the natural state in its most general sense, we should set aside these associations. From this perspective, *agents or actors (the subjects of actions) can be any living beings*, in line with the ancient

Roman natural law theory of Ulpian and Paulus (see: Peretersky 1984: 23-25). In this case, the natural state can be understood as a harmonious community – a “*commonwealth*” or *symbiosis* – of living systems that engage in mutually beneficial *cooperation* (*mutual aid*) and *solidarity* aimed at the common wealth. Within this framework, the “City of God” (Aurelius Augustinus 1998) represents an important example of this universally abstract system of bivalent formal axiology. It functions as the *maximal* filter in the bivalent Boolean algebra of acts and actors (whether individual or collective – this distinction is irrelevant).

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The Amalgamated Mass of Hate: Harold Lasswell's Concept of Propaganda

Abstract. The presented theses consider the concept of propaganda as articulated by American political scientist Harold Lasswell. Lasswell is recognized as part of the first wave of propaganda researchers who published their works in 1920s, and he stands out as the only representative from the academic sphere among them. His renowned work *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927) has been included in all propaganda training courses; however, it was not fully translated into Russian until 2021. This delay, along with several other factors, has contributed to the relative obscurity of Lasswell's propaganda concept within Russian political science. The analysis revealed that his concept of *propaganda* is fundamentally anchored in the figure of *the enemy* and the dynamics of *hate*. Key aspects of hate management are explored in *Propaganda Technique...*, ranging from identification of the enemy, assignment of negative attributes to personalization of hate and its transference to other targets in order to destabilize the enemy. Additional strengths of his 1927 work are highlighted, including a systematic approach to the study of military propaganda, a large number of illustrative examples, an introduction of the psychological framework for understanding propaganda, and its situating within organizational, political and technological contexts. An examination of Lasswell's subsequent investigations into propaganda uncovers two main stages of his research: the conceptual and the quantitative. Nonetheless, despite his shift in focus toward revolutionary propaganda in the 1930s, the conceptual core of his work remains grounded in the manipulation of contradictory relationships. It is illustrated that Lasswell's concept of *propaganda* is relevant for analyzing contemporary political public processes in Russia.

Keywords: propaganda; public opinion; World War I; Harold Lasswell; society; social unity

Introduction: The First Wave of Propaganda Studies and the Role of Propaganda Techniques. The theme of societal cohesion and unity is highly relevant today for various evident reasons: in the early 2020s, Russia faced unprecedented foreign policy challenges. When discussing not just the assessment of societal cohesion and support for authority, but also the formation of unity, it is impossible to overlook the subject of propaganda. The significance of propaganda lies in its capacity to address the societal divisions that often arise with the onset of military conflicts – one segment of the population may perceive events with enthusiasm, while another exhibits substantial psychological resistance. Maintaining national unity can become increasingly challenging over time due to societal fatigue, potentially leading to dire consequences. The events in Russia in 1917 vividly illustrate this phenomenon. Overcoming resistance and preventing fatigue are among the primary functions of propaganda. Thus, despite its seemingly straightforward nature, the mechanisms of propaganda are quite complex. The effective use of propaganda is governed by specific patterns, which have been outlined in various scholarly studies on the subject. Among these works, the conceptual frameworks developed by Harold Lasswell stand out prominently, particularly his treatise *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. This work has become exemplary and is still regarded as a foundational text for propagandists today. Therefore, assessing the current state of public sentiment in Russia necessitates a thorough consideration of Lasswell's contributions to the theory of propaganda.

Research on propaganda began in Western political science in the 1920s, following the conclusion of World War I. The profound impact of propaganda during that war led to its perception as a “dangerous and mysterious phenomenon”, prompting German generals to use it as a means to shift blame for their battlefield defeats (Lasswell 1939: iv). After enduring numerous shocks, society gradually began to reflect on the events, analyzing how hatred was kindled among ordinary people, fueling wartime actions. Within approximately a decade following the end of World War I, a significant body of works was published, which we refer to as *the first wave of propaganda studies*. This collection includes Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (Lippmann 2004),

Edward Bernays' *Propaganda* (Bernays 2010), Arthur Ponsonby's *Lies in Wartime* (Ponsonby, 1940), and Harold Lasswell's renowned *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (Lasswell 2021)¹. These works have long been classified as classics and have been integrated into academic curricula in political science, sociology, and public relations. The only exception is Ponsonby's *Lies in Wartime*, which offers a more critical examination of manipulation techniques rather than an exploration of propaganda mechanisms.

Among these works, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* stands out for several reasons. The primary reason is that it is arguably the only one authored by a classical scholar and constitutes an academic work in the truest sense of the term. Indeed, Lasswell was the only author with direct connections to academia; he enrolled at the University of Chicago in the year the war ended and subsequently worked there as an instructor and professor. It is well-known that *Propaganda Technique...* was his dissertation, published as a book a year after its defense. In contrast, the other pioneers of propaganda studies were removed from the academic environment: Bernays was a practicing public relations specialist; Lippmann was a journalist and political advisor; Ponsonby was a politician in the United Kingdom. All three – Lippmann, Bernays, and Ponsonby – were involved to varying degrees in propaganda or politics during World War I. The first two worked within American propaganda organizations, while Ponsonby was a member of the British Parliament. At the conclusion of the war, Lasswell was only 16 years old, which precluded him from being an active participant in the events; he was merely an observer. Biographers note that he was a student of Charles Merriam, the founder of the Chicago School of Political Science, who led the Rome branch of the Committee on Public Information, the primary propaganda agency of the United States during World War I. Merriam provided Lasswell with comprehensive support in visiting key European capitals

¹ In order to distinguish Lasswell's original text of 1927 (*Propaganda Technique in the World War*) from its first (2021) translation into Russian, it was decided to name the latter *Propaganda Technique in World War I* [in Russ.: *Tekhnika propagandy v mirovoy voyne*]. When there is no need to underline the difference between the two versions of his book, both titles are shortened to *Propaganda Technique...* throughout the paper.

and meeting with participants in the events and processes of that war (Efremenko, Bogomolov 2021: 8).

This background provided Lasswell with a perspective distinctly different from that of other researchers, manifesting in a rigorous scientific approach. Subsequently, building on *Propaganda Technique...*, Lasswell developed his equally renowned model of political communication, which has been incorporated into all textbooks on political science, communication studies, and related fields. However, despite its popularity in the West and significant influence on the advancement of political science, there are only a handful of works in Russia that explore the nuances of Lasswell's propaganda concepts. Notable among them are *Mechanisms of Counteracting Manipulation and Propaganda in the Works of G. Lasswell and J. Dewey* (Chulkov 2022) and *Propaganda as an Instrument of Influence on Political Behavior in the Theory of H.D. Lasswell* (Argun 2021). Other works by Russian scholars tend to focus on different scientific issues that Lasswell addressed, such as political and mass communication (Bulkin 2000; Krivonosov, Kiuru 2022), political reality (Alyushin 2006), and the phenomenon of leadership (Gomelauri 2018), among others. Overall, the examination of Lasswell's legacy in Russian political science does not appear to be particularly thorough. This may be attributed to several apparent reasons. First, the number of translations of his works into Russian is relatively limited (Batalov 2014: 10; Efremenko 2023: 29)². Second, the study of propaganda in contemporary Russian political science has not developed as it should have; instead, related subjects such as information warfare, political communication, and soft power are more frequently investigated.

² In 2005, *Psychopathology and Politics* was translated into Russian (Lasswell 2005). The complete translation of *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* was only released in 2021 (Lasswell 2021), while a shortened version published soon after in 1929 (Lasswell 1929) is hardly satisfactory. In 2023, another work, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* was included in a collection focused on the Chicago School of Thought (Lasswell 2023). To this list, one could add a few translations of articles, which does little to provide a comprehensive understanding of his oeuvre, which, according to *the Britannica*, includes over 30 books and 250 articles. This is particularly noteworthy considering that Lasswell ranks among the ten most cited American political scientists and sociologists in the world (Efremenko 2023: 29).

Quantitative Approach to the Study of Propaganda.

Harold Lasswell outlined his key theses on propaganda in *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. This is one of two his fundamental works on the subject that he himself highlights in the *Theories of Propaganda* section of his annotated biography from 1946 (Lasswell 1946: 131). The second work is entitled as *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study*, and published in 1939 (Lasswell 1939). When selecting the most significant 150 works from a total amount of 3000 titles, he specifically points to *Propaganda Technique*... rather than to *World Revolutionary Propaganda*... This distinction is reasonable, as it is in the former that Lasswell lays the foundational principles for the study of propaganda, with all subsequent works building upon and complementing these initial ideas.

As for the studies on revolutionary propaganda, they were driven by a practical need to understand whether communism would conquer America and whether American society was moving from “individualistic America to a Sovietized state” (Lasswell 1939: v). Chicago was chosen as the case study because, as Lasswell notes, it is a major industrial center that suffered an economic collapse, and the events that occurred there turned out to be significant. What were these important events? The fact is that the predecessor of the Communist Party of America, the Communist Labor Party of America, was founded at a convention in Chicago. There, a strong party cell operated, which gained prominence in the 1930s through high-profile actions. The Chicago communists managed to organize unemployed individuals, protest against their evictions from homes and reductions in benefits, and establish numerous trade unions, among other activities. The most notable event was a funeral procession that drew 60,000 participants after the police killed two Black workers in 1931³. Those studies on the influence of communism in Chicago were conducted by Lasswell primarily using quantitative methods. He calculated the dynamics of organizations affiliated with communists, the number of leaflets and slogans distributed, the membership count of the party, and the quantity of periodicals – both federal and local, in English and other languages, and so on (Lasswell 1939: 108, 221,

³<http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/318.html>

261-262). *World Revolutionary Propaganda* marked an important milestone in Lasswell's career: ten years after *Propaganda Technique...*, he shifted from conceptual research to the use of quantitative methods. By the late 1940s, he articulated his position as follows: genuine knowledge about influence can only be obtained through quantitative methods (Lasswell, Leites 1949: 40-52). He became a true pioneer in the field of statistical content analysis, which required serious resource allocation.

A researcher named Terhi Rantanen identifies two periods in Lasswell's work. The first period, associated with the University of Chicago, spans from 1918 to 1938 and is referred to as the academic period of "progressive internationalism." The second period, characterized by "pragmatism and the advancement of American interests," dates from 1939 to the early 1970s, when he moved from Chicago and primarily lived in Washington, New York, and New Haven. These changes were prompted by close cooperation with governmental structures, into which Lasswell became fully integrated, allowing Rantanen to assess his position in the U.S. political system as that of an *insider* (Rantanen 2024: 49-50). Of course, this new role in the system imposed limitations on his evaluations and judgments, which inevitably influenced the nature of his works. It was during this period that Lasswell further developed his quantitative methods, which he would employ in other works related to propaganda, albeit those became less significant.

For instance, in the essay *Describing the Content of Communications*, included in the annotated bibliography on propaganda and public relations from 1946, Lasswell sets out to assess the influence of Axis⁴ propaganda on American society during World War II. He began this work shortly after the war's onset in 1941, heading the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications at the Library of Congress from 1940 to 1943, which received financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation (Sproule 1989: 16; Rantanen 2024: 63). To accomplish this, Lasswell identified 12 key messages from the propaganda that was meticulously

⁴ The Axis powers (or Axis) is a popular term in the English-speaking segment for what is more commonly referred to in Russian as the *German or Hitlerian coalition*. It derives its name from the more complete term *Berlin-Rome Axis*.

monitored by the relevant agencies, such as “The USA is mired in internal corruption,” “The USA is weak,” and “Japan is strong.” He then calculated that from December 1941 to March 1942, there were 1,195 assertions in American media that aligned with enemy propaganda, while only 45 statements countered them (Lasswell 1946: 75-76).

The value of Lasswell’s works on propaganda from 1939 and 1946 is undeniable in terms of methodological development; however, they do not significantly enhance the understanding of the essence of propaganda. Conceptually, from the late 1920s to the late 1940s, definitions of propaganda examined in this context tend to repeat one another, varying only by minor nuances. This is why the primary focus below will be on his *Propaganda Technique in the World War*.

Propaganda Technique in the World War: Characteristic Features. Before delving into Harald Lasswell’s concept of propaganda as laid out in *Techniques of Propaganda...*, it’s important to highlight some distinctive features of this work. First and foremost, it stands out from other key works from *the first wave propaganda studies* due to its systematic examination of its subject. Lasswell successfully organizes propaganda work into a coherent structure in a relatively concise manner, addressing topics from organizational methods (as seen in the chapter *Organization of Propaganda*) and core objectives (chapters *Guilt in War and War Aims*, *Maintaining Friendly Relations*, *Demoralizing the Enemy*) to key techniques (like chapters *Demonization of the Enemy*, *Illusion of Victory*, *Conditions and Methods of Propaganda*). While Walter Lippmann focuses solely on the nuances of public opinion functioning within propaganda contexts, Edward Bernays emphasizes promoting the novel and miraculous methods of public relations, and Christopher Lasch engages with the function of deceit in propaganda, Lasswell approaches the topic as a comprehensive, systematic endeavor examined from all angles. This multifaceted perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of how propaganda operates and its various implications during wartime.

Secondly, this work serves as an extensive case study. The variety of propaganda techniques presented is vast – ranging from the demonization of the enemy and exploitation of narratives around

sexual crimes to the use of (pseudo)scientific research and “spiritual and ecclesiastical interpretations of war” (Lasswell 2021: 104, 113, 123). In *Propaganda Technique...*, Lasswell does not yet engage in quantitative assessments of specific propaganda techniques, yet the text is rich with manipulative strategies, effectively becoming a universal manual for conducting propaganda.

Thirdly, Lasswell introduces a psychological approach to the study of propaganda, positing that he “develops a simple classification of various psychological materials... and offers a general theory of strategies and tactics for manipulating these materials” (Lasswell 2021: 58). Indeed, *Propaganda Technique...* is imbued with appeals to psychological mechanisms, discussing the psychological nature of propaganda throughout various sections: its impact, resistance to war, dispositions that facilitate the propagandist’s work, barriers, and the consequences of tension, among others. In this way, Lasswell sets the direction for a new field – *the psychology of propaganda*. He would later apply this psychological approach to a different set of issues, primarily focusing on the individual (Lasswell 1935; Lasswell 1948; Lasswell 2005), which positions him as a foundational figure in political psychology (Ascher, Hirschfelder-Ascher 2004).

Fourthly, Lasswell places propaganda within an organizational, political, and institutional context, doing so with a scientific rationality that is not negligible. In *the first wave of propaganda studies*, there are examples that are directly opposite: Lippmann, having lost the struggle for influence over American propaganda to the head of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, expressed his disdain for all propagandists and equated them with charlatans, fraudsters, and terrorists⁵. In contrast, Lasswell dissects the political currents surrounding propaganda with the cold indifference of a surgeon. He observes how influential forces in the British Cabinet, confronted with the prospect of imminent war, attempt to “apply the brakes” in the media, while in Germany, there is increasing disarray in propaganda efforts and a growing

⁵ Lippmann W. The Basic Problem of Democracy, *Atlantic*, November, 1919, available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1919/11/the-basic-problem-of-democracy/569095/> (accessed September 5, 2024).

conflict between civilian and military authorities (Lasswell 2021: 65-66, 85-87). In *Propaganda Technique...*, Lasswell discusses issues such as personnel recruitment, the relationships between propaganda agencies and legislative authorities, and even the financial aspects of propaganda work. Such organizational details are rarely addressed in academic literature on this topic.

Finally, Lasswell is not averse to philosophical reflections on the nature of propaganda. At the very end of his work, he presents several truly profound maxims that are hard to find in other writings: “propaganda is a concession of the rationality of the modern world” and “propaganda is a reflection of the vastness, rationality, and capriciousness of the modern world. It represents a new dynamic of society, where power is divided and dispersed, and one can achieve more with illusions than through coercion” (Lasswell 2021: 227, 229). Here, one can discern allusions to Sigmund Freud (*the concession of rationality*), Niccolò Machiavelli (“one can achieve more with illusions than through coercion”), and Michel Foucault (*dispersed power*).

Definitions of Propaganda. Traditionally, definitions of propaganda revolve around the relationship between power and public opinion, articulated in terms of influence, manipulation, control, and impact. For example, in Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion*, it is formulated as follows: “a group of people that can block others’ direct access to what is happening presents news in such a way that it serves the objectives of that group” (Lippmann 2004: 60). In *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, Lasswell also provides his definition: “propaganda... is exclusively concerned with the control of opinions through significant symbols... Propaganda seeks to manage opinions and attitudes through direct manipulation of social suggestion” (Lasswell 2021: 54-55). A clearer and more unequivocal definition is offered in his article *The Theory of Political Propaganda*, published in the same year, 1927, as his renowned book: propaganda is the management of collective attitudes through the manipulation of significant symbols (Lasswell 1927a: 627). Over the subsequent 20 years, he refines and develops this definition of propaganda, yet its core remains unchanged. In his 1936 work *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* he writes that “any elite defends and asserts itself on behalf of the symbols of a common destiny. These include the ‘ideology’ of the established

order and the ‘utopia’ of counter-elites... A firmly established ideology perpetuates itself through a modicum of planned propaganda from those who benefit most from it” (Lasswell 2023: 94). Scholars note that he sought to give the definitions of propaganda a socially neutral tone (Sproule 1989: 16), which can be attributed to his adherence to quantitative methods. However, such a neutral definition begins to blur the boundaries of propaganda, prompting Lasswell at one point to observe that it becomes “a synonym for any form of communication – from furtive whispers of lecture neighbors to *Voice of America* broadcasts and the dissemination of books on how the planet Venus influenced the fate of humanity” (Lasswell 1950: 284). He further explains that this expansive understanding lacks practical utility and attempts to delineate the scope of propaganda as intentional activity conducted through managed channels of communication.

At the same time, at times, Lasswell himself contributes to an expansive interpretation of propaganda by asserting that the mainstream of American propaganda is not religious, partisan, reformist, official, or philanthropic, but rather commercial propaganda – more specifically, advertising. He states, “If Columbus discovered a continent, then (*the American – author’s note*) nation was shaped by the advertiser” (Lasswell 1941: 37). Here, his position begins to align with that of Bernays, who, in the 1920s, promoted advertising services under the banner of propaganda. Nevertheless, he sometimes departs from neutral formulations. In a definition provided for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* in 1933, Lasswell characterizes it as an immoral phenomenon that democratic leaders are compelled to use as an alternative to violence for coordinating societal actions (Lasswell 1933: 522-526). Such candor is rare for the early stage of Lasswell’s research career, and even more so during his later stage, when he became integrated into the American political establishment.

Development of Propaganda Research. Over time, Lasswell expands the scope of propaganda studies. In his work *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* he identifies a new type of propaganda: *revolutionary propaganda*. He defines it as “the separation of the masses’ sense of attachment from existing symbols of power” and their alignment “with symbols that challenge them”, whereby the hostile feelings that arise are directed at the existing

symbols of power. According to Lasswell, this task is significantly more complex than the challenges associated with military propaganda, as, in the latter case, destructive energies can be channeled through conventional methods (Lasswell 2023: 103). However, a reference to *Propaganda Technique in World War I* reveals that he had already addressed such forms of propaganda in the chapter titled *Demoralizing the Enemy*, where he describes the potential for redirecting public anger toward a new, independent object, thereby diminishing the significance of the nominal enemy. During wartime, the government and rulers themselves can become new targets for this anger, which is noted to be an extremely challenging endeavor (Lasswell 2021: 182). It is not difficult to trace how in *Politics...* he develops the theses from *Propaganda Technique...* by introducing new terminology and highlighting new research directions.

In his 1939 work *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, Lasswell provides a detailed account of these processes, specifying that the subjects of this type of propaganda are counter-elites, while education becomes integrated into the processes of control over the masses during peacetime. In his definition of propaganda, he nearly mirrors the wording he used in 1927, substituting the term *management for control*, and in describing the use of propaganda by elites, he similarly resorts to the manipulation of symbols, as expressed in his earlier work *Politics...* from 1936. Symbols are employed by elites to identify themselves and articulate their historical mission. Each country's ruling elite possesses its own unique set of symbols: for the United States during Lasswell's time, these were the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution; in the Soviet Union, they included Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. When counter-elites begin to introduce their own symbols in opposition, their objective becomes the destruction of faith in the commonly accepted symbols.

Continuing to develop his *rationale*, he points out that the similarity between education and propaganda lies in their shared reliance on symbols. However, education focuses on transmitting widely accepted views, whereas propaganda manipulates contradictory relationships. This important clarification indicates that propaganda arises when there is internal conflict in attitudes within an individual, leading to psychological contradictions

or tensions – a subject we will examine in greater detail later. Education, faced with such problems, is clearly incapable of addressing them. Thus, for the United States, the promotion of traditional Americanism and individualism constitutes education, while the advocacy of communist ideas (or, contemporarily, concepts such as *Russian World* or *Multipolar World*) is seen as propaganda. Conversely, in the Soviet Union, the dissemination of communism took place within the sphere of education, whereas the defense of individualism was classified as propaganda (Lasswell 1939: 9-10). He further affirms that propaganda is activated when it comes to controversial issues, while education deals solely with the transmission of non-contradictory relationships – this is their primary distinction (Lasswell 1946: 1).

Propaganda of Hate. Despite Lasswell's progression in the study of propaganda from military to revolutionary forms, the core of his thought fundamentally remains unchanged. He consistently maintains a definition of propaganda, with minor modifications, that is linked to the manipulation of symbols. However, the main value of his works, particularly *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, lies in his departure from standard definitions to explore the very nature and essence of propaganda. A similar approach was employed by Arthur Ponsonby, who, in his critical work, focuses on lies and offers a detailed categorization of them – from official lies and intentional omissions to deliberate fabrications and false accusations (Ponsonby 1940: 19-22). For Lasswell, a defining characteristic of propaganda is that it is fundamentally constructed around the figure of the enemy, with *hate* serving as its key emotion.

In *Propaganda Technique*... Harald Lasswell articulates several key questions regarding propaganda: how to incite hate toward the enemy, demoralize them, and simultaneously strengthen ties with neutral and allied nations? In answering these questions, he outlines four strategic objectives of propaganda: (1) to mobilize hate against the enemy; (2) to maintain friendly relations with allies; (3) to preserve friendly relations with neutral countries and, where possible, secure their cooperation; and (4) to demoralize the enemy (Lasswell 2021: 207). He perceives the most powerful role of propaganda in these capabilities. As evident from the objectives listed, propaganda begins with hate towards the enemy and culmi-

nates in their demoralization. Lasswell's favored quantitative approach reveals that the concept of *enemy* appears prominently in the chapter titles (*Demonization of the Enemy*⁶ and *Demoralization of the Enemy*) and more than 150 times in the Russian translation of the text, while the terms *hate/hostile* are mentioned over 30 times⁷. It could be argued that a more accurate title for this work would have been *The Hate Technique in World War I*.

The entirety of Lasswell's 1927 book revolves around the unfolding drama of hate. It begins with the challenge of overcoming the resistance to war, as by the early 20th century, peace was regarded as the normal state, while war was seen as an abnormal and unnatural condition for humanity. According to Lasswell, this psychological resistance in modern nations stemmed from a decline in personal loyalty to leaders. The resistance was so significant that participation in war – regardless of who initiated it – had to be framed in public opinion as a defense against the “evil, blood-thirsty aggressor” (Lasswell 2021: 57, 85). The incitement of hate toward the enemy becomes a *recurring motif*, a departure from which, the author argues, is permissible only under exceptional circumstances.

Indeed, the success of propaganda lies in its ability to incite a profound sense of hate toward the enemy. Lasswell subtly notes that “government management of public opinion is an inevitable corollary of great modern war”. However, if we replace “public opinion” with “hate,” a more precise formulation emerges:

⁶ In the original English text, this chapter is titled *Satanism*. Therefore, *Demonization of the Enemy* is an adaptation from Russian «Демонизация Врага» to contemporary conceptual language that reflects the content discussed – namely, the various methods of discrediting the opponent. This nuanced adaptation captures the essence of the techniques used in propaganda to portray the enemy in a negative light, emphasizing the psychological tactics employed to sow distrust and animosity.

⁷ In the original English text, the term *hate* appears 33 times, while *enemy* is mentioned 156 times (Lasswell 1927b). This disproportionate frequency underscores the emphasis that Lasswell places on the concept of the *enemy* in the context of propaganda. The prevalence of the term *enemy* indicates a strategic focus on defining and portraying adversaries as central to the propaganda narrative, which aligns with his argument about the role of hate as a mobilizing force.

the management of hatred becomes a state-critical task, and the success of war hinges on who can cultivate greater animosity. As Lasswell vividly expresses, this process can create an “amalgamated mass of hate” (Lasswell 2021: 227).

The entire *Propaganda Technique*... is dedicated to illustrating the key aspects of managing hate. The enemy must be identified to unleash all indignation upon them. To demonize this enemy, a range of negative attributes must be assigned: the enemy is not just audacious but also treacherous, unconstructive, selfish, dangerous, deceitful, and irritable, among others. When the enemy is a nation purported to have instigated a war, they are characterized as “incorrigible, wicked, and depraved” (Lasswell 2021: 109). The masses need a figure onto whom they can project their hate, which is why propaganda channels this feeling towards the leader of the hostile nation. During World War I, this particularly odious figure became Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, who was portrayed by propagandists as a “mad dog of Europe,” “Cain”, and “the butcher Wilhelm”, with calls to hang him at all costs (Ponsonby 2024: 102).

Finally, to prevent the adversary from drawing energy from hate, it must be redirected to another target. Such a target could be the ruling class of one’s own country, which, through propaganda, is depicted as repulsive, potentially leading to destabilization and revolution, as occurred in czarist Russia. Alternatively, the target could be an ally; for example, *the Entente* sought to drive a wedge between Germany and Austria-Hungary by portraying the Austrians as servants of the Germans and stoking rumors that Austria-Hungary intended to seek a separate peace.

However, if we consider *revolutionary propaganda* instead of *military propaganda*, might we discover that different motives lie at the center of its processes? Thus, could it be that *hate* is not the core of every form of propaganda? Unfortunately, this is not the case. In comparing revolutionary and military propaganda, Lasswell asserts that their psychological function is fundamentally the same: to exercise control over feelings of guilt, weakness, and, most importantly, aggression. Such emotions arise during profound internal conflicts provoked by the contradictions between the individual and surrounding reality, as previously discussed in the context of revolutionary propaganda. According to him, Marxism similarly incites

aggression by attacking capitalism for its predatory nature and projecting onto it the blame for all of humanity's miseries, such as wars, poverty, destitution, and diseases. This mirrors the portrayal of the enemy during wartime.

Another affirmation of the identity of the principal characteristics of propaganda lies in the parallels between the political goals of war and revolution – “to achieve or dominate over the enemy as a means to impose one's will upon them”. Moreover, Lasswell insists that German national socialism in the 1930s, which heavily leaned on antisemitism, borrowed significantly from the contemporary global revolutionary paradigms. However, the creators of this new propaganda could not afford to acknowledge this influence, meticulously concealing the source of their appropriation (Lasswell 2023: 103-105). As a result, we find that there is no form of propaganda that does not fundamentally rely on *hate*.

Conclusion. Thus, for Harold Lasswell, any propaganda is first and foremost a *propaganda of hate and enmity*, engaging the darkest aspects of human nature. In his interpretation, national cohesion during wartime is only possible on this basis. Following the end of World War I, there were numerous discussions concerning whether propaganda is a force for good or evil. Advocates existed for both viewpoints. Among the early researchers, Walter Lippmann and Arthur Ponsonby maintained a perspective on the malign nature of propaganda. Ponsonby even argued that the insidious effects of propaganda are far worse than actual human fatalities, as it taints the soul, which is far more dangerous than the destruction of the body (Ponsonby 1940: 18). In contrast, Edward Bernays defended propaganda, portraying it as a miraculous tool of the invisible government (Bernays 2010: 14), and to distinguish between “good” propaganda and “bad” one, he coined a new term – *impropaganda* (Bernays 1929). Lasswell, for the most part, did not categorize propaganda as either “good” or “bad”, opting for neutral formulations. However, he clearly demonstrated in his work that all propaganda is fundamentally based on the concept of *enemy*, and there is no such thing as *good propaganda*. This is due to the fact that propaganda is employed in extraordinary circumstances, when the natural order of the individual collapses, necessitating the need to provide clarity on extremely contentious issues. Once the foundation of propaganda ceases to be conflict and

instead involves the dissemination of widely accepted knowledge, it transforms into education. Thus, Lasswell effectively delivered a verdict on propaganda.

When examining the situation in Russia, it is crucial not to overlook the understanding of propaganda established by Lasswell. There are varying assessments of propaganda within Russian society: some argue that it is excessive, while others claim it is deficient. As previously demonstrated, Lasswell insisted that propaganda is fundamentally constructed around the figure of the enemy and the associated feelings of hate. Therefore, in evaluating the level of cohesion within Russian society and the role of propaganda in fostering this cohesion, it is essential to first assess the extent to which it is rooted in animosity towards the enemy. Only then can the evaluations be genuinely objective and grounded in scientific inquiry, rather than based on personal impressions.

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Pedagogical Ideals and School Practices: Émile Durkheim's Insights for Citizen Education in Contemporary Russia

Abstract. The article examines the tension between educational ideologies and the practical methods used to implement theoretical ideas in actual teaching environments. To address this issue, the author proposes drawing on the insights of Émile Durkheim. The first section highlights the key elements of the French sociologist's work that are relevant to this topic, such as Durkheim's argument for the autonomy of the social sphere and its influence through collective representations that shape society. Additionally, it discusses his strategies for promoting social solidarity. According to Durkheim, schools serve as institutions of socialization, much like religion did in early societies. Durkheim believed that effective citizen education requires an emphasis on certain components: (1) transmitting collective knowledge about the past and the experiences of previous generations; (2) fostering respect for legitimate authority and its moral influence; and (3) instilling shared values in students. He also recognized that educational systems can be influenced by conflicts between various groups and their differing pedagogical ideals. Durkheim underscored the state's role as a neutral actor that should rise above these conflicts, giving due regard to social morphology. In the Russian context, educational programs should be designed to reflect the collective beliefs and values of the population. These programs should tap into shared emotions and ideas to foster a sense of group identity among individual students. Instead of advancing the ideals of specific groups, the state's objective should be to develop practices that resonate with the collective values and sentiments present within society. When pedagogical ideals and their practical implementation are grounded in collective representations, they can be harmonized effectively.

Keywords: Durkheim; collective representations; sociology of education; civic education; education in Russia; school practices

Contemporary discussions in the field of education studies implicitly suggest that the content of curricula, teaching methods, and similar factors influence the development of the younger generation and, by extension, the future of the country. These elements represent a form of “policy for the future”, with educational institutions acting as vehicles for the idea of progress (Meyer 2010). This perspective can be illustrated by the numerous theories where authors explore the transformational potential of education and its ability to overcome various forms of inequality and drive changes in the social structure (McLaren 2007; Gottesman 2016; Haapasaari et al. 2016). However, the state’s intake quotas, approval of the Federal State Educational Standards (Dobryakova, Frumin 2020; Dobryakova et al. 2018), school and university rituals (Linchenko, Golovashina 2019), the rising discussions about the need to reinstate mandatory student distribution after graduation¹, the traditional nature of teaching methods, and the perception of the education system as one of the most conservative (Leonidova et al. 2018) all point to the continued relevance of the functionalist perspective, which considers education as primarily serving to reproduce the social structure. According to surveys conducted in Russia, people largely associate the effectiveness of school education with its ability to provide knowledge and skills applicable to later life². They also see the primary function of schools as preparing students for professional activity or expanding their horizons³. However, modern research shows that

¹ In Soviet history, mandatory student distribution (or mandatory job placement) was a policy implemented to assign graduates to work in specific jobs or locations determined by the state after completing their higher education. This system was designed to ensure that graduates contributed to the needs of the planned economy by filling positions in various industries, government agencies, or rural areas that required skilled labor. The state would assign jobs based on national economic priorities, and graduates were obligated to work in these positions, often for a set number of years, before they could seek other employment or relocate. – *Translator’s note.*

² School education: opinions of Russians, *VTSIOM*, 29.08.2018, available at: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/shkolnoe-obrazovanie-ocenka-rossiyan> (accessed September 4, 2024). (in Russ.).

³ School education: who should the school prepare? *VTSIOM*, 29.08.2005, available at: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii->

the content and formats of Russian school curricula are outdated and do not meet social demands (Kuzminov et al. 2019). In other words, there is a certain contradiction between educational ideologies, on the one hand, and the ways in which the ideas of theorists are spread and implemented in actual teaching practices, on the other. This contradiction manifests in discussions about the role of the teacher or the educational process (Petrova, Shkabarina 2020; Torikova 2021); decisions made by administrations at various levels that cannot be implemented in real pedagogical activities; stress among school staff due to the mismatch between their perceptions of organizational requirements and their own resources (Efimova, Latyshev 2023); clashing attitudes in teachers' work; and interactions between families and schools (Kasprzhak et al. 2015; Ostroverkh, Tikhomirova 2021). All of this hinders the realization of one of education's main goals – developing a responsible citizen.

In his early work *Suicide*, Émile Durkheim argues that education is a reflection of society: it reproduces and simplifies social structures, but does not form them (Durkheim 1912), which leads him to two key conclusions: first, there is an understanding that educational processes are socially determined, and second, the functions of the educational system must align with the collective beliefs that underpin social solidarity.

Although this article does not aim to justify the relevance of the functionalist metaphor for the modern educational system, it should be noted that Durkheim's views on the formation of civic solidarity and the role of schools in this process appear highly relevant for resolving the contradiction between educational ideologies and pedagogical practices in contemporary Russia.

Durkheim's works on solidarity and moral sociology often receive the most attention, while his contributions to other areas, particularly education, are more frequently overlooked. However, much of his teaching was focused on pedagogy. After completing his studies at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris in 1882,

obzor/shkolnoe-obrazovanie-kogo-segodnya-dolzha-gotovit-shkola (accessed September 4, 2024) (in Russ.); Innovations in school patriotism: pros and cons, VTSIOM, 11.05.2022, available at: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/novacii-shkolnogo-patriotizma-za-i-protiv> (accessed September 4, 2024). (in Russ.).

Durkheim began his teaching career in high schools. In 1887, he joined the University of Bordeaux, where he taught social sciences and pedagogy. In 1902, Durkheim moved to the Sorbonne, while also teaching mandatory courses on education at the École Normale. Many of his works on education and pedagogy, such as *Education and Sociology*, *Moral Education*, and *The Evolution of Educational Thought in France*, were revised lectures, including those for secondary school teachers. His ideas on education were actively supported by the government (Richter 1960; Wallace 1973) and likely continued in the pedagogical practices of his students. Durkheim himself can be considered a classic of education.

It would be an oversimplification to reduce Durkheim's sociology of education to a mere transmission of the state's views on the role of the citizen or a justification of the functionalist metaphor. Durkheim's interest in social morphology also influenced his approach. While he argued that education reflects society, he also emphasized that society cannot be homogeneous. Therefore, the clash between the educational ideals of different social groups is inevitable. Durkheim's focus on social solidarity, which is evident in his work on education, makes his ideas highly relevant for understanding civic education policy in contemporary Russia and offers valuable insights for shaping practical approaches to civic education.

The following will outline key aspects of Durkheim's sociology relevant to this topic, followed by an analysis of pertinent ideas regarding civic education, and finally, a proposal for their potential adaptation to the current context in modern Russia. The ideas of Durkheim concerning moral education, which have already been extensively researched (Jones 1993; Pickering 1979; Wallwork 1972; Watts Miller 1997; Watts Miller 2000), including in Russia (Gofman 2019), will remain beyond the scope of this study.

Thus, the first step is to briefly examine the core concepts of Durkheim's sociology that also shaped his views on education.

First and foremost, Durkheim justifies *the autonomy of society* by emphasizing the precedence of social reality over individual reality. He views society as a force that determines behavior, moral norms, and values, stressing that it does not come from us but imposes itself on us. Therefore, researchers must study the mechanisms of this force (Filloux 1977). The behavior of individuals and

groups, as well as their actions, are shaped by social processes. Social coercion is linked to societal norms, values, and expectations that guide individuals' behavior and their interactions with each other. For Durkheim, the concept of the social fact is crucial: society is made up of these social facts, and studying them empirically is the primary task of sociology (Durkheim 1995). Thus, education, from Durkheim's perspective, is a social practice consisting of social facts.

Society's influence is reflected in *collective representations*. "Collective representations, produced by the action and the reaction between individual minds that form the society, do not derive directly from the latter and consequently surpass them" (Durkheim 1995: 233). While Durkheim does not delve into the question as to where these representations originate, he does focus on the mechanisms through which they are transmitted – through rituals, language, laws, and the education system (Durkheim 1887; Durkheim 1973a; Durkheim, Deploige 1907; Misztal 2003). Regardless of their complex status, these representations ultimately shape society (Durkheim 1900).

Social solidarity, which in Durkheim's earlier work was seen as a result of the division of labor (Durkheim 1996), later becomes linked to collective representations and is sustained by recurring practices (rituals). For Durkheim, "solidarity constitutes the defining characteristic of group life"; it is "the sine qua non of collective action" (Traugott 1984: 325). Rituals include not only the repetitive actions of Australian Aborigines but also the raising of the national flag or the end-of-school-year celebrations in Russian schools. What matters is what society at that time considers sacred – be it a totemic animal image, Christian symbols, or the eternal flame and St. George ribbon. The sacred is continuously experienced as sacred through rituals; only in this way does it remain sacred: "To sustain the sense of historical continuity, a community must be provided with a set of meaningful values and emotions" (Vasilyev 2014: 156). Social solidarity can only exist when individuals share common values and norms. In this context, the state plays an important role in convincing citizens of the importance of a shared identity and value system. It contributes to the formation of public consciousness by encouraging people to reinterpret certain events and give less importance to others, thus reinforcing social unity.

In his later work, Durkheim consistently explored the theme of solidarity, in everything from his shorter articles to his most comprehensive book, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, where he justified the role of rituals and religion in the creation and maintenance of social cohesion. It would, therefore, make perfect sense to speak of a Durkheimian tradition focused on the study of social cohesion and solidarity.

Thus, Durkheim's sociology, including his works on education, was based on the recognition of the autonomy of the social realm and its priority over the individual, as well as the determinative role of collective representations that constitute society. Rituals play a key role in maintaining and transmitting collective representations; however, they do not create these representations independently. Their main function is to reinforce existing ideas and norms, preserving and disseminating them in society.

Let us now turn to Durkheim's views on educating citizens. Durkheim maintained that "education, far from having as its unique and principal object the individual and his interests, is above all the means by which society perpetually recreates the conditions of its very existence" (Durkheim 1956: 123). Durkheim's argument that society is the "source and goal of morality" led him to conclude that "we cannot strive for a morality different from the one connected to the state of our society" (Durkheim 1974: 59, 61). Any pedagogical doctrine "is the result of collective work", and "each society sets up a certain ideal of man, of what he should be" and this image reflects all the features of its structure and organization (Durkheim 1956: 123).

If we consider law, language, and rituals as key mechanisms for transmitting collective representations, as Durkheim repeatedly wrote, the question arises about the institutions that facilitate this transmission. In his work *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim links the socialization of individuals and social solidarity with religion; in the modern world, however, this function is carried out by educational institutions (Wallace 1973: 3), that is, school must transmit established collective representations, which are reflected both in state policy and in the upbringing of the younger generation. Durkheim, recognizing the difficulty of defining collective representations and distinguishing them from situational and contextual emotions, experiences, and reactions, suggests fairly specific prac-

tices whose implementation would contribute to the transmission of collective representations.

Firstly, for the education of a citizen, it is important that the child “be informed about the heritage of those who preceded him” (Durkheim 1973: 247). Durkheim, as a precursor to studies of collective memory (Vasilyev 2014; Misztal 2003), discusses the role of *the experiences of previous generations in shaping the citizen*. State schools should “interpret and express the French spirit” (Durkheim 1956: 107), educate the younger generation with a belief in the moral greatness of France (Durkheim 1977). Just as “our past personae predominate in us and... constitute the unconscious part of ourselves”, educational ideals and visions of the past continue to shape our present practices and understandings (Durkheim 1977: 11). What he means is not the mechanical transmission of information, but the transmission of collective representations through knowledge of the past and corresponding practices. “The truth is that the present, to which we are invited to restrict our attention, is by itself nothing; it is no more than an extrapolation of the past, from which it cannot be severed without losing the greater part of its significance” (Durkheim 1977: 14).

Religion as “the primitive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history” (Durkheim 1973a: 270) is closely linked to the mythic past, which holds the key to collective beliefs, fears, and knowledge. In the future, this role is taken on by the school, which becomes responsible for cultivating a sense of continuity with past generations. Only this sense can engender national solidarity as the solidarity of society’s members, extending beyond the life of one generation or one individual (Durkheim 1973b: 246).

Most likely, when Durkheim spoke of transmitting the experience of previous generations, he referred not only to teaching history in schools but also to school traditions and rituals that demonstrate generational continuity, as well as fostering a sense of national culture and pride in one’s country among students.

Secondly, schools serve to foster respect for legitimate authority and its moral standing, while also teaching children to embrace the “religion of law”, with school discipline being regarded as something sacred (Durkheim 1919: 191-192). Unlike rituals, which are performed periodically, the educational process must instill these qualities consistently and systematically.

Thirdly, a community is built on the foundation of shared core values. These values should not be invented from scratch but collected and selected from those already present in the public consciousness and rooted in traditions, because it is through such values that the collective representations of a community are expressed. Educating students with a focus on common values fosters solidarity.

It is also crucial to examine *the state's role* in educating citizens. The structure of pedagogical ideas is historically specific, shaped by the political context, and evolves within the conditions of collective life, often requiring the suppression of individual autonomy. The prevalent modern notion that working with youth shapes the country's future contradicts Durkheim's perspective: "education, therefore, can be reformed only if society itself is reformed" (Durkheim 1912: 514-515). In other words, new educational programs or teaching methods are meaningless if the social order remains unchanged. Reforms in education should follow changes in collective representations, not dictate them. The purpose of school is to transmit established traditions (Walford, Pickering 1998: 5), not to generate new ones.

At any given point in history, Durkheim notes, there is a prevailing and regulating form of education, and any deviation from it would encounter significant resistance from society (Durkheim 1977). In other words, school is a reflection of the society in which it functions and cannot be completely independent due to its authoritarian structure and economic determinism imposed by society (Walford, Pickering 1998: 6).

The *state*, interested in maintaining social stability and unity among citizens, initiates various practices to strengthen these values, influencing the process of identity formation. Durkheim's argument that society is the "source and goal of morality" led him to conclude that "we cannot strive for a morality different from the one connected to the state of our society" (Durkheim 1974: 59, 61).

Each educational doctrine is the result of society's efforts; it shapes the image of the person that society wants to create, and this image reflects all the characteristics of the social organization (Durkheim 1956: 123). In other words, Durkheim subscribed to the idea that Wundt defended in his ethics (Wundt 1886), namely that the morality, religion, and law of different peoples are the culmina-

tion of collective, slow, and unconscious developments (see: Durkheim 1887: 119-123).

“Since education is an essentially social function, the state cannot be indifferent to it”, on the contrary, education should play an active role in order to ensure that the majority should not systematically “impose its ideas on the children of the minority” (Durkheim 1956: 81). Education should not be “abandoned to the arbitrariness of private individuals” (Durkheim 1956: 81); this does not mean, however, that the state must necessarily monopolize education, but rather that it ensures the equal distribution of this crucial public good and prevents it from falling under the control of any specific group or class.

However, it would be an oversimplification to argue that schools are simply transmitters of the state’s concept of citizenship, raising citizens who fit the state’s needs at any given moment. Society itself is not homogeneous, and therefore, educational ideals can come into conflict. Durkheim illustrates how the conflict between advocates of elite education and proponents of broader access to education (such as the Promethean doctrine expressed in the Rabelaisian ideal of education and the gentlemen’s doctrine described by Erasmus) shaped the development of the French education system (Durkheim 1956: 81).

Another type of conflict arises from real challenges, such as the collective representations of the population and the ideas of educational policymakers, which do not align with these representations but emerge from the views of certain individuals or groups. Durkheim criticizes traditional pedagogy for concentrating on theoretical ideas about education without providing methods for putting them into practice. This gap between theoretical concepts and the actual practice of education can lead to contradictions and hinder civic education.

In addition to the conflict of educational ideals, Durkheim also draws attention to social morphology, emphasizing the need to consider not only the public sphere but also the family, social movements, leisure practices, and to assess the internal logic of these structures and their contributions to social integration, individual autonomy, and voluntary community. The socialization of the future citizen, Durkheim argues, depends not only on the state’s position but also on various social activities – from parent committee

meetings to national debates and public activities. In other words, the upbringing of a citizen is not determined solely by the state, school, or the teacher's work; educational ideals are formed through dialogue and conflict between various actors, and socialization is differentiated, with the influence of its structures depending on whether they are "institutionalized or are in the process of being institutionalized" (Cohen, Arato 1992: X).

A limitation of Durkheim's sociology of education is that it does not explain how educational institutions can become conduits of social determinants. Teachers are not regarded as key contributors in shaping concepts that hold significance for the state. According to Durkheim's core principles, collective representations reflect the natural civil order and, as such, cannot be interpreted within the framework of political discourse. At the same time, education aimed at fostering both citizenship and individuality exists outside this natural order. Rather, it is essential for teachers and the school to understand (or internalize) this order and convey it. The transmission of collective representations – specifically, the values and moral norms they reflect – forms the foundation of civil order and promotes social solidarity.

It should be noted, however, that despite his belief in the deterministic power of social processes, Durkheim "stands for the autonomy and full development of the individual. The highest point in the process of evolution is the emergence of the individual. An individual must be free to be the person he or she believes they can become. Education encourages each individual to advance to the degree she or he is able. The point is that this cannot be achieved apart from the social" (Walford, Pickering 1998: 5). Education, which prepares an individual for life in an "adult" society, must be closely linked to the current conditions of that society and its demands at a particular historical moment. Social connections play a key role in shaping human nature. The new type of integration mentioned by Durkheim means that individualism in modern society is a reflection of the collective conscience.

Thus, the school becomes a replacement for religious organizations as the primary institution for socialization and the formation of solidarity. Durkheim believed that the future of a cohesive society depends on maintaining a moral code of social obligations and duties that benefit both the individual and society. It is important to

recognize that the educational system itself is often shaped by conflicts, which makes this process even more complex. For Durkheim, formal or systematic education was a way to create and maintain consensus and solidarity in a complex, specialized, and diverse society.

Paradoxically, although Durkheim wrote about national values and patriotism, he believed that the society of the future would not be bound by national borders. In the long term, patriotism, as respect for the nation's values, would necessarily be replaced by an international religion shared by all humanity (Wallace 1973: 9). Every citizen has duties to their country, but as Durkheim emphasized, these duties should not outweigh duties to humanity as a whole.

Despite some limitations and contradictions in Durkheim's views on education, his ideas can still be applied in modern Russia.

First and foremost, the formation of a citizen should be based on collective representations, which, as Durkheim demonstrated, define the content of individual consciousness and to a greater extent shape society rather than simply reflect it. The conflict between educational ideologies and the methods used to apply theoretical ideas in practice can be resolved if both ideologies and practices align with collective representations. The success of patriotic education programs and related activities, as well as the achievement of goals set by methodologists and technologists, depends on how well the collective representations in society were considered when designing these programs. It is impossible to reform the entire education system or introduce plans for patriotic education without considering the changes in society as a whole, as education, including the education of citizens, is merely a function of broader social processes. Recognizing the complexity of distinguishing collective representations from social constructs, Durkheim suggested practices in his lectures for teachers to pass on past experiences, promote respect for legitimate authority, and share common values. The teacher must follow these practices and is not required to distinguish between collective representations and manifestations of current trends.

Secondly, to form social solidarity, it is important to purposefully engage the shared feelings and ideas that unite people (Lukes 1973: 166-167). It is not enough to perform formal actions whose necessity may be unclear both to those advocating these actions

and, even more so, to the students who are required to perform them. Rituals – whether for Australian Aborigines or modern Russian schoolchildren – must reproduce collective emotions, relying on the existing system of representations. Following Goffman, it is worth noting that Durkheim often uses traditions, customs, or rituals, including school rituals, as examples of social facts, attributing to them the qualities of being compulsory and existing externally to individuals (Goffman 2015: 127).

Thirdly, one of the main goals of citizenship education is that students must learn to relate their identity to that of the group. Thus, from Durkheim's perspective, the focus should not be on revealing the personal qualities of students, but rather on interpreting education as a process through which the natural person becomes social, with the teacher acting as a guide to the group's objectives. This does not mean that each student's individual characteristics are unimportant, but rather that only within a group, in accordance with social and moral norms, can the student express their individual qualities.

Fourthly, the current education system is often shaped by conflicts between different groups and their educational ideals. Instead of focusing on fulfilling the ideals of one specific group, the state should develop practical methods that align with the collective emotions and values of society, as only these can be successfully implemented.

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Territorial Identity of Russian Society: from Local Fragmentation to Civil Harmony

Abstract. Humans are social beings; as such, they enter into relationships with other people that are structured by issues that are important to them and that involve the participation of social institutions. By virtue of habitation on a particular territory, an individual consistently positions him- or herself as a subject of a local community, which in turn, is subsumed within communities having a higher level of territorial organisation. Each level of this hierarchical social structure differs in the degree of its coherence and integrity as manifested in the phenomenon of territorial identity, which expresses the ability of social communities to maintain the solidarity of citizens' commitment to the social ideals and norms of the national state. The aim of the study is to substantiate the prospects and limitations affecting the formation of civil (national) identity of Russian society while taking the socio-cultural diversity and value heterogeneity of local communities into account. Criteria for characterising social communities are formulated according to the structure of territorial identity, which is discussed in terms of its role in the wider system of social identity. Particular attention is paid to the content of municipal identity, within whose territorial format the greatest sociocultural diversity and axiological heterogeneity are observed. On the basis of the results, a number of measures to help overcome local fragmentation and achieve civil harmony are formulated.

Keywords: territorial identity; municipal identity; social community; local fragmentation; civil harmony; territorial community; social structure

Introduction. The collapse of the USSR led to the loss of Soviet identity and consequent erosion of the community of *the Soviet people*. The subsequent development of Russian statehood, which

was accompanied by the denationalisation of property and increased independence of regions and local communities, has given rise to an urgent need to form a civil identity capable of consolidating the interests of the country's citizens by harmonising relations between different levels of public authority.

The process of creating a new Russian state was accompanied by persistent attempts by a number of Federal Subjects to obtain preferential treatment in comparison other regions, which typically involved significant efforts on the part of regional elites. In giving rise to separatist sentiments, this process consequently became a serious threat to Russian federalism, which was not at that time in a state of mature development.

Complex processes were also taking place at the local level. The municipal reform that was carried out during the early 1990s was aimed at creating a network of territorial entities within the country that would assume responsibility for resolving vital issues for the people living there. For this purpose, the law defined a list of so-called issues of local importance, whose resolution became the responsibility of municipal authorities and thus came under local administrative competence¹. However, the development of local self-government was carried out extremely unevenly on a national scale: while, in sparsely populated and remote settlements, low budgetary provision did not contribute to the activation of local elites, the acquisition of the status of public authority in densely populated and geographically attractive territories gave rise to increased civic activity on the part of the population along with noticeable dynamic evolution trends in business relations.

In this regard, it is important to understand to what extent the interests of local communities are compatible with the interests of the state under unstable conditions and external threats, as well as determining how the territorial organisation of local government can contribute to the formation of a new national identity. As a result of the local government system becoming one of the official levels of public authority in 2020, it also becomes necessary to

¹ Federal Law of 28.08.1995 No. 154-FZ "On General Principles of Organisation of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" (repealed due to the adoption of 131-FZ "On General Principles of Organisation of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" dated 06/10/2003).

consider how this level may be properly integrated into the structure of national identity, along with a reflection on what factors may hinder such integration.

The Phenomenon of Territorial Identity. The creation of public authorities in the format of regions, settlements or administrative districts led to the transformation of the emerging administrative-territorial units into clearly expressed decision-making centres that organised themselves around the dominant sentiments of the local population. These processes gave rise to the phenomenon of territorial identity as defined by the boundaries of a territorial entity and consolidating the interests of the population living within these boundaries. Territorial identity is interpreted by sociologists as a sense of social community among people living in a certain territory, which forms on the basis of the unique characteristics and meanings that constitute the cultural uniqueness of a given territory (see: Smirnyagin 2007; Shmatko, Kachanov 1998; Govers, Go 2009).

Having contributed to a noticeable decrease in the importance of the border factor in relations between countries, globalising trends reveal the problem of preserving the national identity of modern states and the socio-cultural uniqueness of local communities. For example, the rapid expansion of the borders of the European Union during the 2000s, which was accompanied by the creation of a system of supranational institutions, caused a significant transformation of the regional and national identity of the states included in the union. The unification of states at different levels of socio-economic development and having dissimilar value systems led to a significant transformation of their territorial identity. During this period, many European regions and municipalities participating in the implementation of development priorities established by the EU began to interact directly with centralised development funds, essentially bypassing the national level. As noted by Russian researchers, this led to a change in the nature and essence of the historical memory underlying European identity, as a result of which the national framework of the historical memory of Eastern European countries starts to dominate the entire space of the European Union (see, for example: Lifanov 2021).

As a result of territorial identity, people develop a responsibility for the destiny of both their small and large homelands, thus cre-

ating a basis for the sustainable development of the state through the self-organisation of social communities. The formation of territorial identity, which is generally carried out in the context of preserving historical memory that forms the basis of national unity, necessarily involves an understanding of the various suffering and disasters experienced (see: Fishman 2024; Rusakova 2023). However, multi-level and type-specific territorial diversity does not always contribute to the formation of national-state (civil) identity or to the harmonisation of social, ethno-national and property relations in society.

The phenomenon of social identity has long been the focus of the research interest of both Russian and foreign social scientists. Social identity describes a person's awareness of their place in society as based on identification with a certain social group, which contributes to the stability of this social group and its readiness to withstand numerous threats.

Authoritative researchers of identity theory Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann noted that the world of everyday life has both a spatial and a temporal structure. "The reality of everyday life is organised around the "here" of my body and the "now" of my present time" (Berger, Luckmann 1995: 42). Identification in time describes a person's awareness of their place in the historical process, their belonging to a certain historical community, and the demand for skills and values corresponding to a given historical era. The identification of an individual in spatial terms expresses one's geographical localisation, one's belonging to a particular community living within certain formal or informal boundaries, and an awareness of one's uniqueness and exclusivity in relation to other communities.

Russian research in the field of social identity predominantly examines it through the prism of a psychological approach as a way for citizens to perceive the conditions of their existence and explain their attitude towards these conditions. In this context, the concept of *territorial identity* is used as a set of different forms of human attitudes to the environment, as presented in the concepts of *environmental identity*, *place-identity*, and *urban-related identity* (Samoshkina 2008: 44). Thus, according to G.V. Gornova, "*urban identity* is a person's stable idea of him- or herself as a resident of a certain city, a direct experience of their connection with the city, a feeling

of belonging to the city and its inhabitants, involvement in urban life, a certain complexly articulated sense of a common destiny” (Gornova 2019: 12). Considering the typological diversity of territorial entities at different levels, it should be clear that *territorial identity* is a broader concept than *urban identity*. Since representing the most immediate level of the world in which individuals form their social orientations, territorial identity forms an integral part of social identity, reflecting the position of a person within the boundaries of a certain physical area.

Territorial identity also characterises the ability of people to consolidate their interests within the boundaries of territorial entities at one level or another. Berger and Luckmann viewed identity as a phenomenon arising from the dialectical relationship between the individual and society. “Identity”, they claim, “is formed by social processes. Once crystallised, it can be maintained, modified, or even reformed by social relations. Social processes associated with the formation and maintenance of identity are determined by social structure” (Berger, Luckmann 1995: 279). Territorial identity has many levels that reveal the various aspects of a person’s positioning in social space. The national-state level of social space corresponds to civil identity, while the sub-state level corresponds to regional identity, and the local level corresponds to municipal (urban or areal) identity.

One of the most authoritative Russian researchers of social identity, L. Drobizheva, pointed out that identity is formed not so much by the state as by the efforts of society itself to develop the state’s ability to perform its basic functions. In the interactions of individuals and social communities, many diverse identities can be manifested (civil, ethnic, regional, local, etc.) that lead to the establishment of trusting relationships between the respective parties. It is precisely such combined – rather than opposing – multiple identities that are a sign of the harmonious development of society (Drobizheva 2020). The chief theoretical problem that arises here consists in the fact that, for each society, there is a unique hierarchy of identifiers that underlie these identities – if in one society, ethnic or religious identifiers are of chief importance, then for others economic considerations are of greater significance.

This circumstance contributed to the formation of a network of territorial entities differentiated according to various criteria,

the most important of which were ethno-national, geopolitical and economic criteria. National republics, national municipal districts and settlements were formed in the administrative-territorial grid of the Russian Federation mainly in accordance with the ethno-national criterion. The geopolitical criterion in turn required a special designation of the role of border regions and settlements, geostrategic regions and complex constituent entities of the Federation. Meanwhile, thanks to the economic criterion, a number of territorial entities of different levels have received a certain legal status, allowing them to benefit from the regime of work with residents embedded in this status (territorial development zones, territories of advanced socio-economic development, special economic zones, etc.). The formation of typical behavioural reactions among the population living in a particular territorial entity due to the sociocultural typological diversity of territorial entities has led to certain problems in terms of the compatibility of these reactions with each other and the priorities established by the national interest.

The presence of many territorial entities of different types and levels actualises the problem of harmonising identities and forming a civil identity as the basis for the socio-cultural reproduction of the state. The scientific literature covers quite widely the methodological aspects of the formation of civil, ethnic and regional identity (see, for example: Monastyrsky 2017; Nizamova 2014; Kozhanov 2014). However, despite the increasing importance of this level in the context of municipal reform in the country, less attention has been paid to local (municipal) identity.

The Role of Municipal Identity in Achieving Civic Accord.

The creation of local government bodies in the country to grant a certain independence to territories defined within local administrative boundaries has contributed to the expansion of self-organisation and mobilisation mechanisms for the development of settlements, closer interaction between the population and government bodies in solving problems relevant to settlements, and the timelier resolution of issues facing residents. At the same time, the devolution of powers to resolve a number of administrative issues led to a strengthening of local elites, who took the opportunity to expand their influence on the social and economic processes taking place within the boundaries of their municipalities. In his book *How Russia is Organised*, the prominent social anthropologist Simon Kordonsky

accused some local authorities of trying to organise life on their territory in the style of the former tsarist-era estates. He noted that in such settlements, all property capable of generating income tends to belong to the heads of municipalities, their family members and trusted persons or entrepreneurs, who effectively manage the municipality (Kordonsky 2021). Moreover, with the development and strengthening of local self-government, another, much more dangerous tendency has begun to emerge, which could in the long term lead to the destruction of the foundations of statehood and the spiritual unity of the nation. Here we are talking about noticeable manifestations of ethnic and religious identity characteristics within the boundaries of administrative-territorial entities, which have the potential to form intolerance towards the bearers of other cultural traditions who do not share the values of the local elites. Thanks to the powers with which they have been entrusted, local authorities can concentrate within their sphere of influence centres of destabilisation and aggression that are dangerous for the region and the country, even to the extent of harbouring cells of openly extremist organisations (Silantyev 2009). Thus, in June 2024, a double terrorist attack occurred in Dagestan, resulting in the deaths of 19 people, including a priest and a security guard at an Orthodox church. As it turned out, two of the terrorists were the sons of the head of the Sergokalinsky district of Dagestan, Magomed Omarov. Other participants in this terrorist attack included high-ranking representatives of local authorities².

A certain danger is also posed by the existing disproportions in the socio-economic situation of municipalities, which result in significant differences in the standard and quality of life of the local population. Such inequality, which leads to mistrust on the part of citizens of less developed municipalities towards state institutions, consequently entails increased economic dependence of municipal authorities on state support, ultimately preserving inequality between the municipalities themselves, intensifying competition between them for state subsidies, and producing social tensions (Channov 2019).

² Mironova A. *Institutionalised Wahhabism*, 24.06.2024. available at: <https://360.ru/tekst/obshchestvo/institutsionalizirovannyj-vahhabizm/?ysclid=1z9rbfn9x0746353931> (accessed October 10, 2024). (in Russ.).

The above examples demonstrate the manifestation of trends associated with the formation of local government bodies that are potentially dangerous for Russian society, and which, under certain socio-economic and geographical conditions, can become a source of various threats.

Due to the high intensity of intra-community connections associated with the dominant position of the local administration, the phenomenon of *municipal identity* represents the internal mechanism capable of forming powerful centres of administrative influence within the boundaries of administrative-territorial units.

The concept of *municipal identity* is also widely used in foreign scientific literature. Municipal identity is typically considered in terms of inter-municipal competition and the ability of municipalities to develop independent policies and independently participate in receiving grants from international funds (Borwein, Lucas 2023). A number of authors note the importance of taking into account contextual circumstances, since the development of a person's municipal identity depends on the size of the respective municipality, as well as its socio-economic, cultural, institutional and macroeconomic characteristics (see, e.g.: Bühlmann 2012). Questions also arise concerning the definition of administrative boundaries of municipalities in the context of the delineation of property in agglomerations between metropolitan areas and their suburbs (Tyson 2013). A brief review of publications by foreign authors on the role of municipal identity in the development of modern society indicates a wide variety of its manifestations and the importance of the political and socio-economic context for its understanding.

In most cases, the problem of *municipal identity* can be resolved by referring to the concept of *local identity*. Local identity is considered as an integral part of territorial identity (along with national, regional, republican, provincial, etc.). Most often it is characterised as a socio-cultural phenomenon implying a readiness for socially transformative activity and the implementation of this activity at the level of local communities (Morozova, Ulko 2008). However, in the Russian literature there is also a narrower interpretation of the concept; here, local identity is understood as *local-factory identity*, i.e., something that arises in the context of mass employment, which also references the political activity of enterprises (Vitkovskaya, Nazukina 2018). There is also a trend in research

concerning the socio-professional aspect of social identity at the local level, whose subject is the professional activities of municipal employees (Bannykh et al. 2017; Rocheva 2011).

Municipal identity is realised in at least one of the following forms: ethno-national, religious or civil. For example, the process of establishing ethnic identity is inextricably linked with endowing one's community with certain stereotypical characteristics, contrasting these characteristics with foreign communities and thus separating it from them. An individual, as a rule, tends to positively evaluate the groups to which he or she belongs, giving them preference over outgroups. Research by Russian sociologists has demonstrated the tendency on the part of representatives of a particular social group to consider the beliefs and convictions within their group to be more likely to be true, while the convictions of representatives of other groups are considered more likely to be erroneous (Maximova, Morkovkina 2016: 348).

Of course, in itself, municipal identity does not pose any threats. On the contrary, it is precisely thanks to the consolidation of society around local government bodies and the increase in the overall manageability of the territory that forms of self-organisation and self-development of settlements are stimulated to strengthen their economic influence on nearby settlements. Such a consolidation is in turn what facilitates the acquisition of a civic identity at the municipal level. However, such factors as the absence or poor development of institutions of government accountability, a lack of citizen participation in administrative decision-making, nepotism, or a disregard for public demands, can provoke serious consequences that threaten to destroy civil harmony.

The formation of municipal identity can be carried out autonomously from the development of regional or national-state identity. Municipal identity is formed in a close dependence on the ability of the authorities to competently solve the problems that arise in local communities. The inability of the authorities to fulfil this mission leads to local fragmentation and general apathy on the part of the population. The main identifiers of municipal identity are the participation of the population in local elections, the specific value of municipal budget expenditures, and the scope of civic participation in resolving issues of local importance, etc. Ineffective state policy towards local communities, which results in growing

economic disparities between municipalities or ignoring the real needs of citizens, poses a threat of loss of stability in modern society.

In light of the above, the study of municipal identity formation in Russia appears to represent the most important basis for the development of civil society in the country, being one of the prerequisites for the formation of civil identity, which allows for the smoothing out of ethnic, religious or property differences between settlements.

Towards a Civil Identity. The consolidation of public interests, which forms social cohesion and the identity of citizens with their place of residence, is an objective condition that ensures the stability of society (Nevelichko et al. 2022). However, ensuring the consolidation of the interests of diverse social communities – and especially the social strata that comprise them – appears to be an extremely complex state task. As contemporary scholars convincingly argue, neither the much-vaunted national idea, nor religion, nor public morality can serve as the basis for uniting people (Gorshkov, Tikhonova 2022: 228-250). Civil harmony presupposes a similar value attitude of representatives of different social communities towards public institutions. To identify such similarities, it is important to form a holistic understanding of the content of the spheres regulated by these institutions. Their list includes economic, political, social, socio-cultural and other spheres, whose role is to form norms and rules that determine the activities of people in the most significant segments of the everyday world for them. Ensuring the integrity of these spheres entails making them understandable for social perception and assigning functional roles to the elements that underlie them. The main obstacle to achieving civil harmony and forming civic identity is the inability or unwillingness of government bodies to explain the principles according to which basic social spheres are formed, their importance for the reproduction of local communities and the expected consequences of violating these principles, as well as to provide information about possible measures for restoring the integrity of these spheres as a necessary condition for the development of communities.

One of the possible approaches to overcoming the heterogeneity of local communities and forming a consolidating basis for their interaction with each other may be to fill with legal content

the provision on specific mechanisms for the formation of inter-municipal business entities for the joint resolution of issues of local importance, Article 68 of the Federal Law of 06.10.2003 No. 131-FZ “On the General Principles of Organising Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation”. Inter-municipal cooperation in Russia, which is developing today within the framework of non-profit associations and contractual forms, is mainly aimed at resolving issues of protecting and defending common municipal interests before federal and regional government bodies. Unfortunately, however, the development of organisational and economic forms of cooperation that promote social and economic integration of municipalities has not yet become widespread (Leonov 2022).

Local fragmentation as a factor limiting the formation of civic identity is mainly a result of information asymmetry between elites and ordinary citizens. Under such conditions, the inability of the latter to defend their rights may be due either to their ignorance of such rights or to the vagueness and ambiguity of the rules applying within the boundaries of communities. Thus, the formation of holistic ideas about the mechanisms of development of society and respect for the rights of all its participants is dependent on an understanding of territorial identity in all its manifestations.

Conclusion. The presented study allows us to formulate a number of theoretical conclusions and specific practical recommendations. *Territorial identity* is a complex, multi-level concept that involves many models of citizen behaviour and means for their adaptation to life in social communities. Given the hierarchical system of territorial entities that has developed in the Russian Federation, certain disproportions may arise in the compatibility of types of territorial identity that arise at national, regional, municipal and local levels, which can hinder the consolidation of society and harmonisation of relations between diverse social groups. Local fragmentation at the municipal level is largely caused by the uneven development of local communities and their dependency on higher budget levels, which tends to result in people leaving their native places to realise their destiny elsewhere. The key factors behind such a tendency include the weak involvement of local communities in the processes of solving problems of national importance, the unwillingness of people to influence the development of basic public spheres on which their well-being depend, and the loss of trust in

local administrations. As well as provoking crises of territorial identity at the local level, these factors can stymie tendencies towards social consolidation at higher territorial levels. Under such conditions, it therefore becomes very important to preserve the ability of citizens to play a more active role at the local level: to exercise their right to participate in elections of government bodies and the formation of local budgets, as well as to receive all the necessary information about the state of the social and engineering infrastructure of the settlement, etc. The desire of state authorities to finance local government bodies through centralised funds can hardly be considered a positive factor. As we have seen, such practices tend to increase competition between municipalities, thus creating fertile soil for corruption and hindering civil harmony. Conversely, the development of inter-municipal unions, whose remit includes the implementation of inter-municipal projects in the interests of residents of the municipalities participating in these unions, can be seen as the most important condition for achieving civil harmony.

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The Positive Impact of Public Opinion on Legislation in China

Abstract. The study highlights the important role of public opinion in driving legislative changes. By illustrating the positive impact of public opinion on refining the law of necessary defense in China, it demonstrates how public discourse surrounding notable cases can generate substantial social influence, prompting legislative changes. The study argues that legislative bodies should give greater consideration to public sentiment during the lawmaking process to align legislation with public expectations, thereby enhancing its legitimacy and societal acceptance. Furthermore, the study outlines the potential risks associated with radicalized public opinion and the possibility of laws being modified due to excessive pressure. It also highlights the considerable potential for cooperation in the legal sphere between Russia and China. Strengthening mutual exchanges and collaborative efforts could allow both nations to gain valuable insights into each other's legislative practices, fostering progress in refining their respective legal systems.

Keywords: public opinion; legislative amendments; necessary defense; China and Russia

In September 2020, the Supreme People's Court of China, the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China, and the Ministry of Public Security of China jointly published a document titled “Guidelines for the Application of Necessary Self-Defense” to define the scope of permissible self-defense. On November 27 of the same year, the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China released six typical cases where individuals acting in self-defense were not arrested or prosecuted. This publication further clarified the rights of citizens to self-defense.

The report on the work of the Supreme People's Court of China, presented at the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2024, highlighted that between 2021 and 2023, 77 defendants were acquitted in self-defense cases. The report emphasized that “the law must not yield to criminal acts” and called for the practical enforcement of “Article 20”¹. Notably, public opinion has played a significant role in the application of self-defense regulations, starting with high-profile cases such as those of Deng Yujiao, Yu Huan, and Yu Haiming in Kunshan, Jiangsu Province. As a result, China's criminal code has become more refined, reflecting these societal shifts.

1. Typical Self-Defense Cases and Public Opinion. Advancements in science and technology, coupled with growing citizen awareness, have led to increased public participation in affairs of the state, particularly online. As a result, public opinion, especially online, now plays a significant role in shaping legislation. The Deng Yujiao case in 2009 brought the concept of *self-defense* into the public spotlight for the first time, marking the beginning of online public discussion influencing court decisions. This was followed by the landmark cases of Yu Huan and Yu Haiming, which had a profound impact on judicial practice and contributed to the refinement of Chinese legislation. Striking the right balance between emotions, rationality, and the law remains a critical challenge for legislative and judicial authorities.

In the eyes of the public, Deng Yujiao, Yu Huan, and Yu Haiming were compelled to act in self-defense, which was seen as justified rather than excessive, and they should not have faced criminal charges. Public discussions largely focused on the urgency, necessity, and intent behind their actions. Many began questioning previous rulings of “excessive self-defense” in similar cases, as well as the current legislation, calling for urgent amendments and improvements to the law.

This surge in public attention to the issue of self-defense can be explained by the fact that self-defense corresponds to citizens' fundamental need to protect themselves and resist in order to safeguard their own lives when faced with sudden and unjustified aggression. In the process of building a law-abiding society,

¹ “The law must not yield to crimes”, and “Article 20” must be put into practice, available at: <https://www.shszx.gov.cn/shzx/mtsd/content/7ebf8ce7-51ff-4ae2-a6f1-5c36ba276642.html> (accessed March 09, 2024). (in Chinese).

the definition and application of self-defense as an important legal means of self-protection for citizens have always been surrounded by much discussion. According to Article 20 of the Criminal Code of the PRC, “an act committed to stop an unlawful infringement, undertaken to protect the state, public interests, or the life, property, and other rights of the defender or others from an ongoing illegal infringement, is considered necessary defense and does not entail criminal liability if harm is caused to the person carrying out the unlawful act. If the force used in self-defense clearly exceeded the necessary limits and caused significant harm, criminal liability arises; however, the prescribed punishment must be mitigated or the person may be exempted from punishment. If defense against ongoing fights, attempted murders, robberies, rapes, kidnappings, and other crimes involving violence that pose a serious danger to personal safety results in the perpetrator's death or injury, such defense is not considered excessive, and criminal liability does not arise”².

2. Positive Influence of Public Opinion on Legislation.

The self-defense cases of Deng Yujiao, Yu Huan, and Yu Haiming illustrate the profound impact of public opinion on legislation. In 2009, Deng Yujiao was initially arrested for intentional murder, but the court ultimately ruled her actions as excessive self-defense, reflecting public sentiment that she acted out of necessity rather than malice. This case, widely discussed in the media and online, highlighted concerns about the application of self-defense laws and led to a shift in legal thinking. Similarly, in 2016, following public outcry, Yu Huan's sentence was reduced from life imprisonment to five years, signaling the influence of public opinion on judicial decision-making. In 2018, the prosecution intervened in Yu Haiming's case, recognizing his actions as legitimate self-defense and dropping the charges, further emphasizing the growing impact of public opinion on legal rulings. Over nearly a decade, these cases demonstrate how public opinion has shaped the legislative process in China, pushing for changes that reflect the values and expectations of society, and ultimately increasing the legitimacy and social acceptance of the law.

² Article 20. The Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China (as amended in 2011). (in Chinese).

To prevent the misuse of the law, all countries, including China, set limits on when self-defense is justified. In China, the vast majority of court rulings related to self-defense have concluded that the actions exceeded the boundaries of legitimate defense: 95 % were classified as intentional harm to health, and 4 % as intentional murder³. From an emotional perspective, public opinion tends to sympathize with individuals in vulnerable positions, such as Deng Yujiao, Yu Huan, and Yu Haiming. The concern and apprehension these cases generate often lead to distrust and dissatisfaction with the judicial system and the government, as people question whether the law is applied fairly and justly in cases of self-defense.

The judicial system of China has responded to both the contentious issues in public opinion and the problems inherent in judicial decision-making. The “Guidelines for the Application of Necessary Self-Defense” require that the subjectivity of individuals be considered in legal proceedings, and that the intent to defend oneself be taken into account. This document also advocates for moving away from consequentialism and effectively transforming the judicial concepts influenced by it. When determining whether the defendant acted with the intent to defend themselves, the judgment should be made from the defender's perspective, taking into account the nature, intensity, and danger of the unlawful intrusion, as well as the circumstances the defender was facing.

3. The Influence of Media and Public Opinion on Legislation. The media plays a crucial role in the discussion of self-defense cases, serving as a key channel for information dissemination. Beyond reporting the facts, the media amplify contentious issues through in-depth analysis by legal professionals, sparking broader public debate which not only expands the scope of discussions but also deepens the public's understanding of self-defense. However, the anonymity of the internet can fuel negative emotions, leading to collective sentiments that may undermine the quality of legislative consultations⁴. Excessive emotional responses and the spread

³ Tung Yukting, Quan Quan. Defensive Intent as a Flaw in the Theory of Self-Defense, *Politics and Law*, 2021, no. 310(3), pp. 118–127. (in Chinese).

⁴ Zhang Aijun, Zhang Yuan. Practical Advantages, Dilemmas, and Solutions of Networked Consultative Democracy, *Forum Jianhuai*, 2019, no. 296(4), pp. 63–69. (in Chinese).

of rumors hinder the circulation of objective information, contributing to alienation in the public sphere. As Habermas noted, this reflects the tyranny of the majority, with heightened emotionality and a lack of rational procedural mechanisms⁵. The fast pace of law-making, driven by public pressure, can result in flawed procedures and hastily adopted laws⁶. In short, the quality of legislation can suffer under the weight of public opinion.

Thus, the transition from public opinion to legislative amendments is complex and dynamic. It involves the growth of public opinion, media analysis, the development of public consensus, and the review and refinement of laws. This process not only highlights the relationship between public opinion and legislation but also embodies the socialist spirit of the rule of law.

Russia and China have significant potential for cooperation in the legal sphere. Strengthening exchanges and collaboration can deepen mutual understanding of each country's legislative experiences, fostering progress in improving their respective legal systems. Moving forward, Russia and China can expand their cooperation in areas such as environmental protection, intellectual property, e-commerce, and other emerging markets. They can also collaborate to address global challenges like transnational crime, cybersecurity, and terrorism, contributing to global peace and stability.

⁵ Xu Yang. Retrial of Public Opinion: The Dilemma and the Way Out of the Judicial Process, *Chinese Legal Journal*, 2012, no. 2, pp. 182–193. (in Chinese).

⁶ Zhang Xin. New Media: Public Participation and Legislation Under Pressure, *Hebei Law*, 2016, vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 90–101. (in Chinese).