UDC 32:303.01

Alexander B. Belousov
Institute of Philosophy and Law,
Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences,
Ekaterinburg, Russia
E-mail: ektb@ya.ru
ORCID: 0000-0003-0082-909X

The Amalgamated Mass of Hate: Harold Lasswell's Concept of Propaganda

Abstract. The presented theses consider the concept of propaganda as articulated by American political scientist Harold Lasswell. Lasswell is recognized as part of the first wave of propaganda researchers who published their works in 1920s, and he stands out as the only representative from the academic sphere among them. His renowned work *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927) has been included in all propaganda training courses; however, it was not fully translated into Russian until 2021. This delay, along with several other factors, has contributed to the relative obscurity of Lasswell's propaganda concept within Russian political science. The analysis revealed that his concept of *propaganda* is fundamentally anchored in the figure of *the enemy* and the dynamics of *hate*. Key aspects of hate management are explored in *Propaganda Technique*..., ranging from identification of the enemy, assignment of negative attributes to personalization of hate and its transference to other targets in order to destabilize the enemy. Additional strengths of his 1927 work are highlighted, including a systematic approach to the study of military propaganda, a large number of illustrative examples, an introduction of the psychological framework for understanding propaganda, and its situating within organizational, political and technological contexts. An examination of Lasswell's subsequent investigations into propaganda uncovers two main stages of his research: the conceptual and the quantitative. Nonetheless, despite his shift in focus toward revolutionary propaganda in the 1930s, the conceptual core of his work remains grounded in the manipulation of contradictory relationships. It is illustrated that Lasswell's concept of *propaganda* is relevant for analyzing contemporary political public processes in Russia.

Keywords: propaganda; public opinion; World War I; Harold Lasswell; society; social unity

Introduction: The First Wave of Propaganda Studies and the Role of Propaganda Techniques. The theme of societal cohesion and unity is highly relevant today for various evident reasons: in the early 2020s, Russia faced unprecedented foreign policy challenges. When discussing not just the assessment of societal cohesion and support for authority, but also the formation of unity, it is impossible to overlook the subject of propaganda. The significance of propaganda lies in its capacity to address the societal divisions that often arise with the onset of military conflicts – one segment of the population may perceive events with enthusiasm, while another exhibits substantial psychological resistance. Maintaining national unity can become increasingly challenging over time due to societal fatigue, potentially leading to dire consequences. The events in Russia in 1917 vividly illustrate this phenomenon. Overcoming resistance and preventing fatigue are among the primary functions of propaganda. Thus, despite its seemingly straightforward nature, the mechanisms of propaganda are quite complex. The effective use of propaganda is governed by specific patterns, which have been outlined in various scholarly studies on the subject. Among these works, the conceptual frameworks developed by Harold Lasswell stand out prominently, particularly his treatise *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. This work has become exemplary and is still regarded as a foundational text for propagandists today. Therefore, assessing the current state of public sentiment in Russia necessitates a thorough consideration of Lasswell's contributions to the theory of propaganda.

Research on propaganda began in Western political science in the 1920s, following the conclusion of World War I. The profound impact of propaganda during that war led to its perception as a "dangerous and mysterious phenomenon", prompting German generals to use it as a means to shift blame for their battlefield defeats (Lasswell 1939: iv). After enduring numerous shocks, society gradually began to reflect on the events, analyzing how hatred was kindled among ordinary people, fueling wartime actions. Within approximately a decade following the end of World War I, a significant body of works was published, which we refer to as *the first wave of propaganda studies*. This collection includes Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (Lippmann 2004),

Edward Bernays' *Propaganda* (Bernays 2010), Arthur Ponsonby's *Lies in Wartime* (Ponsonby, 1940), and Harold Lasswell's renowned *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (Lasswell 2021)[1]. These works have long been classified as classics and have been integrated into academic curricula in political science, sociology, and public relations. The only exception is Ponsonby's *Lies in Wartime*, which offers a more critical examination of manipulation techniques rather than an exploration of propaganda mechanisms.

Among these works, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* stands out for several reasons. The primary reason is that it is arguably the only one authored by a classical scholar and constitutes an academic work in the truest sense of the term. Indeed, Lasswell was the only author with direct connections to academia; he enrolled at the University of Chicago in the year the war ended and subsequently worked there as an instructor and professor. It is well-known that *Propaganda Technique…* was his dissertation, published as a book a year after its defense. In contrast, the other pioneers of propaganda studies were removed from the academic environment: Bernays was a practicing public relations specialist; Lippmann was a journalist and political advisor; Ponsonby was a politician in the United Kingdom. All three – Lippmann, Bernays, and Ponsonby – were involved to varying degrees in propaganda or politics during World War I. The first two worked within American propaganda organizations, while Ponsonby was a member of the British Parliament. At the conclusion of the war, Lasswell was only 16 years old, which precluded him from being an active participant in the events; he was merely an observer. Biographers note that he was a student of Charles Merriam, the founder of the Chicago School of Political Science, who led the Rome branch of the Committee on Public Information, the primary propaganda agency ofthe United States during World War I. Merriam provided Lasswell with comprehensive support in visiting key European capitals

[1] In order to distinguish Lasswell's original text of 1927 (*Propaganda Technique in the World War*) from its first (2021) translation into Russian, it was decided to name the latter *Propaganda Technique in World War I* [in Russ.: *Tekhnika propagandy v mirovoy voyne*]. When there is no need to underline the difference between the two versions of his book, both titles are shortened to *Propaganda Technique…* throughout the paper.

and meeting with participants in the events and processes of that war (Efremenko, Bogomolov 2021: 8).

This background provided Lasswell with a perspective distinctly different from that of other researchers, manifesting in a rigorous scientific approach. Subsequently, building on *Propaganda Technique*…, Lasswell developed his equally renowned model of political communication, which has been incorporated into all textbooks on political science, communication studies, and related fields. However, despite its popularity in the West and significant influence on the advancement of political science, there are only a handful of works in Russia that explore the nuances of Lasswell's propaganda concepts. Notable among them are *Mechanisms of Counteracting Manipulation and Propaganda in the Works of G. Lasswell and J. Dewey* (Chulkov 2022) and *Propaganda as an Instrument of Influence on Political Behavior in the Theory of H.D. Lasswell* (Argun 2021). Other works by Russian scholars tend to focus on different scientific issues that Lasswell addressed, such as political and mass communication (Bulkin 2000; Krivonosov, Kiuru 2022), political reality (Alyushin 2006), and the phenomenon of leadership (Gomelauri 2018), among others. Overall, the examination of Lasswell's legacy in Russian political science does not appear to be particularly thorough. This may be attributed to several apparent reasons. First, the number of translations of his works into Russian is relatively limited (Batalov 2014: 10; Efremenko 2023: 29)[2]. Second, the study of propaganda in contemporary Russian political science has not developed as it should have; instead, related subjects such as information warfare, political communication, and soft power are more frequently investigated.

[2] In 2005, *Psychopathology and Politics* was translated into Russian (Lasswell 2005). The complete translation of *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* was only released in 2021 (Lasswell 2021), while a shortened version published soon after in 1929 (Lasswell 1929) is hardly satisfactory. In 2023, another work, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* was included in a collection focused on the Chicago School of Thought (Lasswell 2023). To this list, one could add a few translations of articles, which does little to provide a comprehensive understanding of his oeuvre, which, according to *the Britannica*, includes over 30 books and 250 articles. This is particularly noteworthy considering that Lasswell ranks among the ten most cited American political scientists and sociologists in the world (Efremenko 2023: 29).

Quantitative Approach to the Study of Propaganda. Harold Lasswell outlined his key theses on propaganda in *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. This is one of two his fundamental works on the subject that he himself highlights in the *Theories of Propaganda* section of his annotated biography from 1946 (Lasswell 1946: 131). The second work is entitled as *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study*, and published in 1939 (Lasswell 1939). When selecting the most significant 150 works from a total amount of 3000 titles, he specifically points to *Propaganda Technique*… rather than to *World Revolutionary Propaganda*… This distinction is reasonable, as it is in the former that Lasswell lays the foundational principles for the study of propaganda, with all subsequent works building upon and complementing these initial ideas.

As for the studies on revolutionary propaganda, they were driven by a practical need to understand whether communism would conquer America and whether American society was moving from "individualistic America to a Sovietized state" (Lasswell 1939: v). Chicago was chosen as the case study because, as Lasswell notes, it is a major industrial center that suffered an economic collapse, and the events that occurred there turned out to be significant. What were these important events? The fact is that the predecessor of the Communist Party of America, the Communist Labor Party of America, was founded at a convention in Chicago. There, a strong party cell operated, which gained prominence in the 1930s through high-profile actions. The Chicago communists managed to organize unemployed individuals, protest against their evictions from homes and reductions in benefits, and establish numerous trade unions, among other activities. The most notable event was a funeral procession that drew 60,000 participants after the police killed two Black workers in 1931[3]. Those studies on the influence of communism in Chicago were conducted by Lasswell primarily using quantitative methods. He calculated the dynamics of organizations affiliated with communists, the number of leaflets and slogans distributed, the membership count of the party, and the quantity of periodicals – both federal and local, in English and other languages, and so on (Lasswell 1939: 108, 221,

[2] http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/318.html

261-262). *World Revolutionary Propaganda* marked an important milestone in Lasswell's career: ten years after *Propaganda Technique*..., he shifted from conceptual research to the use of quantitative methods. By the late 1940s, he articulated his position as follows: genuine knowledge about influence can only be obtained through quantitative methods (Lasswell, Leites 1949: 40-52). He became a true pioneer in the field of statistical content analysis, which required serious resource allocation.

A researcher named Terhi Rantanen identifies two periods in Lasswell's work. The first period, associated with the University of Chicago, spans from 1918 to 1938 and is referred to as the academic period of "progressive internationalism." The second period, characterized by "pragmatism and the advancement of American interests," dates from 1939 to the early 1970s, when he moved from Chicago and primarily lived in Washington, New York, and New Haven. These changes were prompted by close cooperation with governmental structures, into which Lasswell became fully integrated, allowing Rantanen to assess his position in the U.S. political system as that of *an insider* (Rantanen 2024: 49-50). Of course, this new role in the system imposed limitations on his evaluations and judgments, which inevitably influenced the nature of his works. It was during this period that Lasswell further developed his quantitative methods, which he would employ in other works related to propaganda, albeit those became less significant.

For instance, in the essay *Describing the Content of Communications*, included in the annotated bibliography on propaganda and public relations from 1946, Lasswell sets out to assess the influence of Axis[4] propaganda on American society during World War II. He began this work shortly after the war's onset in 1941, heading the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications at the Library of Congress from 1940 to 1943, which received financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation (Sproule 1989: 16; Rantanen 2024: 63). To accomplish this, Lasswell identified 12 key messages from the propaganda that was meticulously

[4] The Axis powers (or Axis) is a popular term in the English-speaking segment for what is more commonly referred to in Russian as the *German* or *Hitlerian coalition*. It derives its name from the more complete term *Berlin-Rome Axis*.

monitored by the relevant agencies, such as "The USA is mired in internal corruption," "The USA is weak," and "Japan is strong." He then calculated that from December 1941 to March 1942, there were 1,195 assertions in American media that aligned with enemy propaganda, while only 45 statements countered them (Lasswell 1946: 75-76).

The value of Lasswell's works on propaganda from 1939 and 1946 is undeniable in terms of methodological development; however, they do not significantly enhance the understanding of the essence of propaganda. Conceptually, from the late 1920s to the late 1940s, definitions of propaganda examined in this context tend to repeat one another, varying only by minor nuances. This is why the primary focus below will be on his *Propaganda Technique in the World War*.

Propaganda Technique in the World War: Characteristic Features. Before delving into Harald Lasswell's concept of propaganda as laid out in *Techniques of Propaganda*..., it's important to highlight some distinctive features of this work. First and foremost, it stands out from other key works from *the first wave propaganda studies* due to its systematic examination of its subject. Lasswell successfully organizes propaganda work into a coherent structure in a relatively concise manner, addressing topics from organizational methods (as seen in the chapter *Organization of Propaganda*) and core objectives (chapters *Guilt in War and War Aims, Maintaining Friendly Relations, Demoralizing the Enemy*) to key techniques (like chapters *Demonization of the Enemy, Illusion of Victory, Conditions and Methods of Propaganda*). While Walter Lippmann focuses solely on the nuances of public opinion functioning within propaganda contexts, Edward Bernays emphasizes promoting the novel and miraculous methods of public relations, and Christopher Lasch engages with the function of deceit in propaganda, Lasswell approaches the topic as a comprehensive, systematic endeavor examined from all angles. This multifaceted perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of how propaganda operates and its various implications during wartime.

Secondly, this work serves as an extensive case study. The variety of propaganda techniques presented is vast – ranging from the demonization of the enemy and exploitation of narratives around

sexual crimes to the use of (pseudo)scientific research and "spiritual and ecclesiastical interpretations of war" (Lasswell 2021: 104, 113, 123). In *Propaganda Technique…*, Lasswell does not yet engage in quantitative assessments of specific propaganda techniques, yet the text is rich with manipulative strategies, effectively becoming a universal manual for conducting propaganda.

Thirdly, Lasswell introduces a psychological approach to the study of propaganda, positing that he "develops a simple classification of various psychological materials… and offers a general theory of strategies and tactics for manipulating these materials" (Lasswell 2021: 58). Indeed, *Propaganda Technique…* is imbued with appeals to psychological mechanisms, discussing the psychological nature of propaganda throughout various sections: its impact, resistance to war, dispositions that facilitate the propagandist's work, barriers, and the consequences of tension, among others. In this way, Lasswell sets the direction for a new field – *the psychology of propaganda*. He would later apply this psychological approach to a different set of issues, primarily focusing on the individual (Lasswell 1935; Lasswell 1948; Lasswell 2005), which positions him as a foundational figure in political psychology (Ascher, Hirschfelder-Ascher 2004).

Fourthly, Lasswell places propaganda within an organizational, political, and institutional context, doing so with a scientific rationality that is not negligible. In *the first wave of propaganda studies*, there are examples that are directly opposite: Lippmann, having lost the struggle for influence over American propaganda to the head of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, expressed his disdain for all propagandists and equated them with charlatans, fraudsters, and terrorists[5]. In contrast, Lasswell dissects the political currents surrounding propaganda with the cold indifference of a surgeon. He observes how influential forces in the British Cabinet, confronted with the prospect of imminent war, attempt to "apply the brakes" in the media, while in Germany, there is increasing disarray in propaganda efforts and a growing

[5] Lippmann W. The Basic Problem of Democracy, *Atlantic*, November, 1919, available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1919/11/the-basic-problem-of-democracy/569095/ (accessed September 5, 2024).

conflict between civilian and military authorities (Lasswell 2021: 65-66, 85-87). In *Propaganda Technique…*, Lasswell discusses issues such as personnel recruitment, the relationships between propaganda agencies and legislative authorities, and even the financial aspects of propaganda work. Such organizational details are rarely addressed in academic literature on this topic.

Finally, Lasswell is not averse to philosophical reflections on the nature of propaganda. At the very end of his work, he presents several truly profound maxims that are hard to find in other writings: "propaganda is a concession of the rationality of the modern world" and "propaganda is a reflection of the vastness, rationality, and capriciousness of the modern world. It represents a new dynamic of society, where power is divided and dispersed, and one can achieve more with illusions than through coercion" (Lasswell 2021: 227, 229). Here, one can discern allusions to Sigmund Freud (*the concession of rationality*), Niccolò Machiavelli ("one can achieve more with illusions than through coercion"), and Michel Foucault (*dispersed power*).

Definitions of Propaganda. Traditionally, definitions of propaganda revolve around the relationship between power and public opinion, articulated in terms of influence, manipulation, control, and impact. For example, in Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, it is formulated as follows: "a group of people that can block others' direct access to what is happening presents news in such a way that it serves the objectives of that group" (Lippmann 2004: 60). In *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, Lasswell also provides his definition: "propaganda… is exclusively concerned with the control of opinions through significant symbols… Propaganda seeks to manage opinions and attitudes through direct manipulation of social suggestion" (Lasswell 2021: 54-55). A clearer and more unequivocal definition is offered in his article *The Theory of Political Propaganda*, published in the same year, 1927, as his renowned book: propaganda is the management of collective attitudes through the manipulation of significant symbols (Lasswell 1927a: 627). Over the subsequent 20 years, he refines and develops this definition of propaganda, yet its core remains unchanged. In his 1936 work *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* he writes that "any elite defends and asserts itself on behalf of the symbols of a common destiny. These include the 'ideology' of the established

order and the 'utopia' of counter-elites… A firmly established ideology perpetuates itself through a modicum of planned propaganda from those who benefit most from it" (Lasswell 2023: 94). Scholars note that he sought to give the definitions of propaganda a socially neutral tone (Sproule 1989: 16), which can be attributed to his adherence to quantitative methods. However, such a neutral definition begins to blur the boundaries of propaganda, prompting Lasswell at one point to observe that it becomes "a synonym for any form of communication – from furtive whispers of lecture neighbors to *Voice of America* broadcasts and the dissemination of books on how the planet Venus influenced the fate of humanity" (Lasswell 1950: 284). He further explains that this expansive understanding lacks practical utility and attempts to delineate the scope of propaganda as intentional activity conducted through managed channels of communication.

At the same time, at times, Lasswell himself contributes to an expansive interpretation of propaganda by asserting that the mainstream of American propaganda is not religious, partisan, reformist, official, or philanthropic, but rather commercial propaganda – more specifically, advertising. He states, "If Columbus discovered a continent, then (*the American – author's note*) nation was shaped by the advertiser" (Lasswell 1941: 37). Here, his position begins to align with that of Bernays, who, in the 1920s, promoted advertising services under the banner of propaganda. Nevertheless, he sometimes departs from neutral formulations. In a definition provided for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* in 1933, Lasswell characterizes it as an immoral phenomenon that democratic leaders are compelled to use as an alternative to violence for coordinating societal actions (Lasswell 1933: 522-526). Such candor is rare for the early stage of Lasswell's research career, and even more so during his later stage, when he became integrated into the American political establishment.

Development of Propaganda Research. Over time, Lasswell expands the scope of propaganda studies. In his work *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How?* he identifies a new type of propaganda: *revolutionary propaganda*. He defines it as "the separation of the masses' sense of attachment from existing symbols of power" and their alignment "with symbols that challenge them", whereby the hostile feelings that arise are directed at the existing

symbols of power. According to Lasswell, this task is significantly more complex than the challenges associated with military propaganda, as, in the latter case, destructive energies can be channeled through conventional methods (Lasswell 2023: 103). However, a reference to *Propaganda Technique in World War I* reveals that he had already addressed such forms of propaganda in the chapter titled *Demoralizing the Enemy*, where he describes the potential for redirecting public anger toward a new, independent object, thereby diminishing the significance of the nominal enemy. During wartime, the government and rulers themselves can become new targets for this anger, which is noted to be an extremely challenging endeavor (Lasswell 2021: 182). It is not difficult to trace how in *Politics*… he develops the theses from *Propaganda Technique*… by introducing new terminology and highlighting new research directions.

In his 1939 work *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, Lasswell provides a detailed account of these processes, specifying that the subjects of this type of propaganda are counter-elites, while education becomes integrated into the processes of control over the masses during peacetime. In his definition of propaganda, he nearly mirrors the wording he used in 1927, substituting the term *management* for *control*, and in describing the use of propaganda by elites, he similarly resorts to the manipulation of symbols, as expressed in his earlier work *Politics*… from 1936. Symbols are employed by elites to identify themselves and articulate their historical mission. Each country's ruling elite possesses its own unique set of symbols: for the United States during Lasswell's time, these were the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution; in the Soviet Union, they included Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. When counter-elites begin to introduce their own symbols in opposition, their objective becomes the destruction of faith in the commonly accepted symbols.

Continuing to develop his *rationale*, he points out that the similarity between education and propaganda lies in their shared reliance on symbols. However, education focuses on transmitting widely accepted views, whereas propaganda manipulates contradictory relationships. This important clarification indicates that propaganda arises when there is internal conflict in attitudes within an individual, leading to psychological contradictions

or tensions – a subject we will examine in greater detail later. Education, faced with such problems, is clearly incapable of addressing them. Thus, for the United States, the promotion of traditional Americanism and individualism constitutes education, while the advocacy of communist ideas (or, contemporarily, concepts such as *Russian World* or *Multipolar World*) is seen as propaganda. Conversely, in the Soviet Union, the dissemination of communism took place within the sphere of education, whereas the defense of individualism was classified as propaganda (Lasswell 1939: 9-10). He further affirms that propaganda is activated when it comes to controversial issues, while education deals solely with the transmission of non-contradictory relationships – this is their primary distinction (Lasswell 1946: 1).

Propaganda of Hate. Despite Lasswell's progression in the study of propaganda from military to revolutionary forms, the core of his thought fundamentally remains unchanged. He consistently maintains a definition of propaganda, with minor modifications, that is linked to the manipulation of symbols. However, the main value of his works, particularly *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, lies in his departure from standard definitions to explore the very nature and essence of propaganda. A similar approach was employed by Arthur Ponsonby, who, in his critical work, focuses on lies and offers a detailed categorization of them – from official lies and intentional omissions to deliberate fabrications and false accusations (Ponsonby 1940: 19-22). For Lasswell, a defining characteristic of propaganda is that it is fundamentally constructed around the figure of the enemy, with *hate* serving as its key emotion.

In *Propaganda Technique*… Harald Lasswell articulates several key questions regarding propaganda: how to incite hate toward the enemy, demoralize them, and simultaneously strengthen ties with neutral and allied nations? In answering these questions, he outlines four strategic objectives of propaganda: (1) to mobilize hate against the enemy; (2) to maintain friendly relations with allies; (3) to preserve friendly relations with neutral countries and, where possible, secure their cooperation; and (4) to demoralize the enemy (Lasswell 2021: 207). He perceives the most powerful role of propaganda in these capabilities. As evident from the objectives listed, propaganda begins with hate towards the enemy and culmi-

nates in their demoralization. Lasswell's favored quantitative approach reveals that the concept of *enemy* appears prominently in the chapter titles (*Demonization of the Enemy*[6] and *Demoralization of the Enemy*) and more than 150 times in the Russian translation of the text, while the terms *hate/hostile* are mentioned over 30 times[7]. It could be argued that a more accurate title for this work would have been *The Hate Technique in World War I*.

The entirety of Lasswell's 1927 book revolves around the unfolding drama of hate. It begins with the challenge of overcoming the resistance to war, as by the early 20th century, peace was regarded as the normal state, while war was seen as an abnormal and unnatural condition for humanity. According to Lasswell, this psychological resistance in modern nations stemmed from a decline in personal loyalty to leaders. The resistance was so significant that participation in war – regardless of who initiated it – had to be framed in public opinion as a defense against the "evil, bloodthirsty aggressor" (Lasswell 2021: 57, 85). The incitement of hate toward the enemy becomes a *recurring motif*, a departure from which, the author argues, is permissible only under exceptional circumstances.

Indeed, the success of propaganda lies in its ability to incite a profound sense of hate toward the enemy. Lasswell subtly notes that "government management of public opinion is an inevitable corollary of great modern war". However, if we replace "public opinion" with "hate," a more precise formulation emerges:

---

[6] In the original English text, this chapter is titled *Satanism*. Therefore, *Demonization of the Enemy* is an adaptation from Russian «Демонизация Врага» to contemporary conceptual language that reflects the content discussed – namely, the various methods of discrediting the opponent. This nuanced adaptation captures the essence of the techniques used in propaganda to portray the enemy in a negative light, emphasizing the psychological tactics employed to sow distrust and animosity.

[7] In the original English text, the term *hate* appears 33 times, while *enemy* is mentioned 156 times (Lasswell 1927b). This disproportionate frequency underscores the emphasis that Lasswell places on the concept of the *enemy* in the context of propaganda. The prevalence of the term enemy indicates a strategic focus on defining and portraying adversaries as central to the propaganda narrative, which aligns with his argument about the role of hate as a mobilizing force.

the management of hatred becomes a state-critical task, and the success of war hinges on who can cultivate greater animosity. As Lasswell vividly expresses, this process can create an "amalgamated mass of hate" (Lasswell 2021: 227).

The entire *Propaganda Technique*… is dedicated to illustrating the key aspects of managing hate. The enemy must be identified to unleash all indignation upon them. To demonize this enemy, a range of negative attributes must be assigned: the enemy is not just audacious but also treacherous, unconstructive, selfish, dangerous, deceitful, and irritable, among others. When the enemy is a nation purported to have instigated a war, they are characterized as "incorrigible, wicked, and depraved" (Lasswell 2021: 109). The masses need a figure onto whom they can project their hate, which is why propaganda channels this feeling towards the leader of the hostile nation. During World War I, this particularly odious figure became Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, who was portrayed by propagandists as a "mad dog of Europe," "Cain", and "the butcher Wilhelm", with calls to hang him at all costs (Ponsonby 2024: 102).

Finally, to prevent the adversary from drawing energy from hate, it must be redirected to another target. Such a target could be the ruling class of one's own country, which, through propaganda, is depicted as repulsive, potentially leading to destabilization and revolution, as occurred in czarist Russia. Alternatively, the target could be an ally; for example, *the Entente* sought to drive a wedge between Germany and Austria-Hungary by portraying the Austrians as servants of the Germans and stoking rumors that Austria-Hungary intended to seek a separate peace.

However, if we consider *revolutionary propaganda* instead of *military propaganda*, might we discover that different motives lie at the center of its processes? Thus, could it be that *hate* is not the core of every form of propaganda? Unfortunately, this is not the case. In comparing revolutionary and military propaganda, Lasswell asserts that their psychological function is fundamentally the same: to exercise control over feelings of guilt, weakness, and, most importantly, aggression. Such emotions arise during profound internal conflicts provoked by the contradictions between the individual and surrounding reality, as previously discussed in the context of revolutionary propaganda. According to him, Marxism similarly incites

aggression by attacking capitalism for its predatory nature and projecting onto it the blame for all of humanity's miseries, such as wars, poverty, destitution, and diseases. This mirrors the portrayal of the enemy during wartime.

Another affirmation of the identity of the principal characteristics of propaganda lies in the parallels between the political goals of war and revolution – "to achieve or dominate over the enemy as a means to impose one's will upon them". Moreover, Lasswell insists that German national socialism in the 1930s, which heavily leaned on antisemitism, borrowed significantly from the contemporary global revolutionary paradigms. However, the creators of this new propaganda could not afford to acknowledge this influence, meticulously concealing the source of their appropriation (Lasswell 2023: 103-105). As a result, we find that there is no form of propaganda that does not fundamentally rely on *hate*.

Conclusion. Thus, for Harold Lasswell, any propaganda is first and foremost a *propaganda of hate and enmity*, engaging the darkest aspects of human nature. In his interpretation, national cohesion during wartime is only possible on this basis. Following the end of World War I, there were numerous discussions concerning whether propaganda is a force for good or evil. Advocates existed for both viewpoints. Among the early researchers, Walter Lippmann and Arthur Ponsonby maintained a perspective on the malign nature of propaganda. Ponsonby even argued that the insidious effects of propaganda are far worse than actual human fatalities, as it taints the soul, which is far more dangerous than the destruction of the body (Ponsonby 1940: 18). In contrast, Edward Bernays defended propaganda, portraying it as a miraculous tool of the invisible government (Bernays 2010: 14), and to distinguish between "good" propaganda and "bad" one, he coined a new term – *impropaganda* (Bernays 1929). Lasswell, for the most part, did not categorize propaganda as either "good" or "bad", opting for neutral formulations. However, he clearly demonstrated in his work that all propaganda is fundamentally based on the concept of *enemy*, and there is no such thing as *good propaganda*. This is due to the fact that propaganda is employed in extraordinary circumstances, when the natural order of the individual collapses, necessitating the need to provide clarity on extremely contentious issues. Once the foundation of propaganda ceases to be conflict and

instead involves the dissemination of widely accepted knowledge, it transforms into education. Thus, Lasswell effectively delivered a verdict on propaganda.

When examining the situation in Russia, it is crucial not to overlook the understanding of propaganda established by Lasswell. There are varying assessments of propaganda within Russian society: some argue that it is excessive, while others claim it is deficient. As previously demonstrated, Lasswell insisted that propaganda is fundamentally constructed around the figure of the enemy and the associated feelings of hate. Therefore, in evaluating the level of cohesion within Russian society and the role of propaganda in fostering this cohesion, it is essential to first assess the extent to which it is rooted in animosity towards the enemy. Only then can the evaluations be genuinely objective and grounded in scientific inquiry, rather than based on personal impressions.

Reference

Alyushin A. 2006. Harold Lasswell on the Nature of Political Reality, *Polis. Political Studies*, no. 5, pp. 158–170. (in Russ.).

Argun L.L. 2021. Propaganda as a Tool for Political Behavior Influence in the Theory of H.D. Lasswell, *Sotsial'no-gumanitarnye znaniya*, no. 2, pp. 333–338, doi 10.34823/sgz.2021.2.51583 (in Russ.).

Ascher W., Hirschfelder-Ascher B. 2004. Linking Lasswell's Political Psychology and the Policy Sciences, *Policy Sciences*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 23–36, doi 10.1023/B:OLIC.0000035460.18318.b0

Batalov E. 2014. *American Political Thought of the XX century*, Moscow, Progress-Traditsiya, 616 p. (in Russ.).

Bernays E. 2010. *Propaganda*, Moscow, Hippo Publishing, 176 p. (in Russ.).

Bernays E., Martin E. 1929. Are We Victims of Propaganda: A Debate, *The Forum*, 1929, March, vol. 81, iss. 3, pp. 142–149.

Bulkina I. 2000. *Harold D. Lasswell's Theory of Political Communication: Dissertation*. Kazan, 159 p. (in Russ.).

Chulkov D.I. 2022. Mechanisms to Counter Manipulation and Propaganda in the Works of G. Lasswell and J. Dewey, *Voprosy nacional'nyh i federativnyh otnoshenij*, vol. 12, no. 9(90), pp. 3336–3343, doi 10.35775/PSI.2022.90.9.017 (in Russ.).

Efremenko D. 2023. "New Science of Politics", Chicago Version, *D.V. Efremenko (ed.). Chicago School of Political Thought (1920–1940s)*, Moscow, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp. 5–52. (in Russ.).

Efremenko D., Bogomolov I. 2021. The Anatomy of Propaganda,

or the "War of Ideas over Ideas", *H.D. Lasswell. Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Moscow, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp. 4–43. (in Russ.).

Gomelauri A. 2018 Studying the Phenomenon of Leadership Through the Prism of G. Lasswell, J. Barber and J. Blondel Ideas, *Sovremennye nauchnye issledovaniya i razrabotki*, no. 10(27), pp. 1008–1011. (in Russ.).

Krivonosov A.D., Kiuru K.V. 2022. Paradigmatics of the Modern Mass Communication System in the Model of G. Lasswell, *Theoretical and Practical Issues of Journalism*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 27–40, doi 10.17150/2308-6203.2022.11(1).27-40 (in Russ.).

Lasswell H. 1927a. The Theory of Political Propaganda, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 627–631.

Lasswell H. 1927b. *Propaganda Technique in World War*, New York, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 238 p.

Lasswell H. 1929. *Propaganda Technique in the World War* Moscow, State Publishing House – Department of Military Literature, 200 p. (in Russ.).

Lasswell H. 1933. Propaganda, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, New York, Macmillian, pp. 521–528.

Lasswell H. 1935. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, London, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 328 p.

Lasswell H. 1939. *World Revolutionary Propaganda. A Chicago study*, New York [etc.], A.A. Knopf, 393 p.

Lasswell H. 1941. *Democracy Through Public Opinion*, The Eleusis of Chi Omega, vol. 43, pt. 2, no. 1, pp. 35–37.

Lasswell H. 1946. *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion; a comprehensive reference guide*, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 456 p.

Lasswell H. 1948. *Power and Personality*, New York, Norton, 262 p.

Lasswell H. 1950. Propaganda and Mass Insecurity, *Psychiatry*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 284–285.

Lasswell H. 2005. *Psychopathology and Politics*, Moscow, Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Public Administration, 352 p. (in Russ.).

Lasswell H. 2021. *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Moscow, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 237 p. (in Russ.).

Lasswell H. 2023. Politics: Who Achieves What, When and How? *D.V. Efremenko (ed.). Chicago School of Political Thought (1920–1940s)*, Moscow, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp. 77–221. (in Russ.).

Lasswell H., Leites N. 1949. *Language of Politics. Studies in Quantitative Semantics*, 2nd ed., New York, G.W. Stewart, Inc., 398 p.

Lippman W. 2004. *Public Opinion*, Moscow, Institut fonda "Obshchestvennoe mnenie", 384 p. (in Russ.).

Ponsonby A. 1940. *Falsehood in War-Time*, 10th ed., London, George Allen & Unwin LTD, 192 p.

Ponsonby A. 2024. Falsehood in War-Time: Atrocity Stories, Faked Photographs, the Criminal Kaiser, and Germany's Sole Responsibility for the War, *Antinomies*, vol. 24, iss. 2, pp. 88–106, doi 10.17506/268672 06_2024_24_2_88 (in Russ.).

Rantanen T. 2024. *Dead Men's Propaganda: Ideology and Utopia in Comparative Communications Studies*, London, LSE Press, 363 p.

Sproule M. 1989. Social Responses to Twentieth-Century Propaganda, *Propaganda. A Pluralistic Perspective*, New York, Praeger, pp. 5–22.